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THE LEGISLATOR-IN-CHIEF
ABSTRACT
The State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses of Article II,
Section 3provide that the President "shall from time to time give to
the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend
to their consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient. "Those thirty-one words envision the President as the
lead active participant in the embryonic stages of the making of
laws. Eight separate principles animate the President's legislative
duties and powers before the presentment process. When the State
of the Union and Recommendation Clauses are seen to have this
textual and analytical subtlety, they reveal the sophistication of the
Framers' design that the President, through her institutionally
unique ability to acquire and analyze information valuable to the
leadership of the Republic, would have significantly more to
contribute to the legislative process than merely to sign off on their
creation by Congress. Far from making the President a cipher in the
legislative process, the Constitution created the Legislator-in-Chief
2002]
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INTRODUCTION
Americans today identify the President as the Legislator-in-
Chief. When presidential candidates promise, We the People
listen-carefully. There is much truth to the popular recognition of
the President as the Legislator-in-Chief: Ever since the New Deal,
we truly have had a populist, plebiscitarian presidency.'
This vision of the President may seem modem, but the
Constitution itself has always recognized the President as a super-
legislator. The Veto Clauses of Article I, Section 7 give the President
the "last word" on all legislation, absent an override by a two-thirds
supermajority of both Houses of Congress.2 The President, however,
sometimes has the important "first word" on legislation, too. The
State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses of Article II,
Section 3 provide that the President "shall from time to time give to
the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend
to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient ... ." Justice Hugo Black in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer' summarized the obvious one-two punch this way: The
President's "functions in the lawmaking process" are simply "the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad."5
1. For a intriguing discussion, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
67-70 (1991). For a discussion of the President's ascendance as Legislator-in-Chief in the
twentieth century under the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-
1984, at 303-17 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE
DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 127-54 (1981).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. The fact that the Veto Clause is located in Article
I and not Article II further signifies the legislative contour of the President's "last word."
Professor Amar has called this type of textual argument from the location of a clause in the
Constitution "organization-chart textualism." See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112
HARv. L. REv. 747, 797 n.197 (1999); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2002). This species of textual argument is also the subject of a forthcoming work
by one of the authors. See Vasan Kesavan, Organization-Chart Textualism (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
4. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
5. Id. at 587. For a criticism of this famous sentence as being too simplistic, see J.
Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 11, 2001, 19 CONST.
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Although much has been written about the Veto Clauses,6 the
State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses remain embar-
rassingly underexamined in legal scholarship. The problem is not
merely one within the legal academy. Contemporary accounts
suggest that these clauses were underexamined at the Founding
because they were uncontroversial. There is no recorded debate on
CoMMENT. (forthcoming 2002).
In addition to the President's "first word" and "last word" in the process of law making, the
President is also the lead constitutional actor in the process of treaty making. See U.S. CONsT.
art. II, § 2, c. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."). To the
extent that the treaty-making power is properly characterized as legislative in nature (a
subject of academic dispute especially given its placement in Article II and not Article I, see,
for example, John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1967 (1999)), the President is the
Legislator-in-Chief of the process of treaty making as well as that of law making. Indeed, the
President is the lead constitutional actor in the process of treaty making more so than that
of law making- No treaty may be made without the President, whereas a bill becomes law over
a presidential veto if there is a two-thirds supermajority in each House of Congress. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
6. For a partial sample, see Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the
Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 735 (1993); Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation
Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its
Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL L. REV. 265 (2001); Michael B; Rappaport,
Veto Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 771 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak, The
Line-Item Veto Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1498 (1995); J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas
A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
437 (1990) [hereinafter Sidak & Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto]; J. Gregory Sidak &
Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush Repudiate the "Inherent" Line-Item Veto?, 9
J.L. & POL. 39 (1992).
7. A search for the phrase "State of the Union Clause" on the Westlaw database yielded
a paltry four results. Search of WESTLAW, JLR Library (Dec. 31, 2001). The four results,
however, were from a distinguished group of scholars. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions
on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Some Opinions]; Jay S.
Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
A search for the phrase 'Recommendation Clause" yielded significantly more
results-twenty-eight to be exact. Search of WESTLAW, JLR Library (Dec. 31, 2001).
Eighteen results, however, are references to an article written by one of us, see J. Gregory
Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEo. L.J. 2079 (1989) [hereinafter Sidak,
Recommendation Clause], and one reference is erroneous. For subsequent, useful articles
mentioning the Recommendation Clause, see Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval?
The Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative History, 48 ARK L. REV. 1 (1994) and
Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The President's Place in "Legislative History,"
89 MICH. L. REV. 399 (1990).
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these clauses at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. In The
Federalist No. 77, Alexander Hamilton simply observed that "no
objections halve] been made to this class of authorities; nor could
they possibly admit of any."' Notable early commentators on the
Constitution echoed this sentiment.9
Notwithstanding such neglect, benign or otherwise, the State
of the Union and Recommendation Clauses stand atop Article II,
Section 3 as grand contours of the "executive Power" vested in
the President by means of the Vesting Clause of Article II.10As
such, they are no less important than the other clauses of
Article II. The Supreme Court has listed the State of the Union and
Recommendation Clauses as some of the "awesome" powers
entrusted to, and duties imposed on, the President. Alexander
Hamilton thought these clauses important enough to place them
first among all clauses specifying the contours of executive power in
his private, unadopted draft of the Constitution. 2
This Article explores these two least discussed clauses of Article
II. A careful parsing of the thirty-one words of these clauses yields
insights into the presidency that are both timely and timeless.
Through these clauses we analyze the President's constitutional role
in the origination of legislation. We use, in addition to familiar
methods of constitutional analysis, tools from economic theory
concerning asymmetric information and organizational design. Our
analysis reveals the State of the Union and Recommendation
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9. See, e.g., JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 270 (Little, Brown & Co.
1826) ("The propriety and simplicity of these [Article II, § 3] duties speak for themselves.");
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTON OFTHE UNITED STATES § 1555 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray & Co. (1833)) [hereinafter STORY'S COMMENTARIES]. Justice Story argued:
The first part [of Article II, Section 31, relative to the president's giving
information and recommending measures to congresS, is so consonant with the
structure of the executive departments of the colonial, and state governments,
with the usages and practice of other free governments, with the general
convenience of congress, and with a due share of responsibility on the part of the
executive, that it may well be presumed to be above all real objection.
Id.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.").
11. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 551 n.6 (1977).
12. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 624 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) [hereinafter FARRAND].
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Clauses as surprisingly rich and relevant to the modern conception
of the Presidency.
I. THE STATE OF THE UNION CLAUSE
The State of the Union Clause can be dissected into four core
principles." We call these (i) the executive duty principle,"' (ii) the
periodicity principle, 5 (iii) the publicity principle, 6 and (iv) the
public deliberation principle.' We consider each in turn and show
how these principles and the principles of the Recommendation
Clause" cohere to give substance to these two clauses and to
illuminate the President's constitutional role as the Legislator-in-
Chief.
A. "He Shall": The Executive Duty Principle
The phrase "[hI e shall" is the font of the executive duty principle.
The State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses are obviously
about the President. A quick glance at the rest of the Constitution
confirms that no analogous clauses appear in Articles I or III. This
fact is a textual hint that there is something special about these
clauses relating to the features and functions of the presidency.
The clauses do not signify any kind of congressional prerogative.
They do not provide that "Congress may from time to time require
the President to give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union." Some, however, have called for just such a reading of the
State of the Union Clause. For example, Raoul Berger, in his work
13. For articles utilizing a similar organizational strategy of carefully parsing the text of
a clause in bite-size chunks, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) (analyzing U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1); Amar, Some
Opinions, supra note 7 (presenting seven principles of the Opinion Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, ci. 1); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995) (examining the Self-Incrimination
Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V); and John F. O'Connor, The Emoluments Clause: An Anti-
Federalist Intruder in a Federalist Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (1995) (analyzing the
Emoluments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2).
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See infra Part I.D.
18. See infra Part II.
2002]
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on executive privilege, has written that Congress may request
performance of the President's duty under the State of the Union
Clause at its convenience.19 This reading is textually awkward and
wrong: The President is not, constitutionally speaking, the inferior
of Congress, but is the head of an independent and coequal branch
of government."2
Another clause of Article II governs a different information
exchange and provides an important textual clue that underscores
the idea of an executive duty. The Opinion Clause provides that the
President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices .... " There is a vast
difference between the phrase "may require" in the Opinion Clause
and the phrase "shall give" in the State of the Union Clause. The
Opinion Clause governs an information exchange between a
superior and his inferiors, whereas the State of the Union Clause
governs an information exchange between two equals.22 The
former clause implies the specification of orders to, and the
evaluation of the performance by, someone to whom the President
has delegated executive power. The analogy is to a principal and
agent relationship." The latter clause, in contrast, implies joint
19. See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTrTUIONAL MYTH 37-38 (1974)
(concluding that the State of the Union Clause supports Congress's "absolute power of
inquiry" and is "the reciprocal of the familiar legislative power to inquire"). More generally,
the Supreme Court has suggested that the power to require reports of executive officers of the
United States is incident to the legislative power. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694
(1988) (stating that receiving reports from executive officers of the United States is "incidental
to the legislative function").
20. See Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege: A
Response to Berger, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 541, 555 (2000) (arguing that the State of the
Union Clause "means the opposite of what Berger suggests").
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
22. See Amar, Some Opinions, supra note 7, at 658 (noting that the State of the Union
Clause is "rp]erhaps the best textual illustration of coordinacy in the reporting and opining
contexts" and "exemplifies a meeting of equals"); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 7, at 1207
n.262 (stating that the State of the Union Clause "gives Congress no power to require
presidential opinions in writing upon any subject relating to the President's duties, because
the Clause governs information exchanges between two independent and co-equal
departments of the national government").
23. See generally Michael Jensen & William Meclding, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (providing an
overview of agency concepts in a business context).
(Vol. 44:1
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production resulting from two separate, but mutually dependent
actors.24
The State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses do not
signify executive prerogative, but rather executive duty. The
Framers used "shall" as a word of obligation,25 and the use of the
word "shall" in the State of the Union Clause strongly suggests that
the President is constitutionally obligated to "give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient .. 26
The precursors to the State of the Union and Recommendation
Clauses are illuminating. An early draft of the clauses by the
Committee of Detail2" made explicit that the clauses are an
executive duty: "It shall be his Duty to inform the Legislature of the
Condition of U.S. so far as may respect his Department-to
recommend Matters to their Consideration . This draft clause
mirrored the language in Article XIX of the New York Constitution
of 1777, which provided that "it shall be the duty of the governor to
inform the legislature, at every session, of the condition of the State,
so far as may respect his department; to recommend such matters
to their consideration as shall appear to him to concern its good
government, welfare, and prosperity."29
24. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (examining the idea of joint or team
production in the business context).
25. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741,782 & n.147 (1984)
(stating that the Framers used "shall" as a word of obligation and "may" as a word of
discretion and providing numerous examples in the Constitution); see also 1 FARRAND, supra
note 12, at 185-86 (noting that the Framers carefully distinguished between the words
"ought," "shall," and "may" in the drafting of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1, cl. 1); 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 412 (remarks of George Mason) (noting the
strength of the word "shall").
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
27. The Committee of Detail consisted of five persons (alphabetically): Oliver Ellsworth
(Connecticut), Nathaniel Gorham (Massachusetts), Governor Edmund Randolph (Virginia),
John Rutledge (South Carolina), and James Wilson (Pennsylvania). See 2 FARRAND, supra
note 12, at 97, 106. The Committee of Detail's mandate was to report a Constitution "for the
establishment of a national government, except what respects the Supreme Executive." Id.
at 85.
28. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 158 (emphasis added).
29. N.Y. CONsT. of 1777, art. XIX, in 2 THE FEDERALAND STATE CONSTITrTIONS, COLONIAL
20021
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Early commentators on the Constitution agreed that the State
of the Union and Recommendation Clauses are mandatory. Justice
Story wrote in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution:
There is great wisdom, therefore, in not merely allowing, but in
requiring, the president to lay before congress all facts and
information, which may assist their deliberations; and in
enabling him at once to point out the evil, and to suggest the
remedy. He is thus justly made responsible, not merely for a due
administration of the existing systems, but for due diligence and
examination into the means of improving them.8"
Similarly, William Rawle, in his treatise on the Constitution, wrote
that "[tihe president is also required to recommend to their
consideration such measures as he may deem expedient."3
What about the Recommendation Clause? In 1993, the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated that, while
"[tihe Framers intended the Take Care Clause to be an affir-
mative duty on the President and the President alone," the
Recommendation Clause "is less an obligation than a right."32 This
reading of the Recommendation Clause is wrong. The President is
obligated to make recommendations to Congress-more precisely,
those recommendations that she deems to be "necessary and
expedient. 33 The secret drafting history of the Recommendation
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1335 (Benjamin Perley Poore
ed., Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2001) (1878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITTIONSi
(emphasis added). Professor Farrand has suggested the importance of Article XIX of the New
York Constitution of 1777 as an extratextual source of original public meaning relating to
Article II, stating that in the drafting of the Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention, "the
state constitutions were continually drawn upon," and that the New York Constitution of 1777
.seems to have been used more extensively than any other ... and especially in connection with
the executive." MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITrTION OF THE UNITED STATES
128-29 (1913).
30. 3 STORYS COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 1555 (emphasis added).
31. See WIALIM RAWLE, AVIEW OFTHE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNrTED STATES OF AMERICA
172 (1825) (hereinafter RAWLE's COMMENTARY (first emphasis added).
32. Ass'n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For additional discussion, see infra Part III.C. (discussing the
executive discretion principle of the Recommendation Clause). Modern academic
commentators have embraced the notion that the Recommendation Clause is mandatory, at
least in part. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Everything I Need To Know About Presidents I Learned
From Dr. Seues, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUS. POLVY 381, 383 (2001) (reading the Recommendation
Clause as indicating that "[the President] must recommend to Congress 'such Measures as
[Vol. 44:1
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Clause confirms that the Framers made the Recommendation
Clause an executive duty as well. The report of the Committee of
Detail provided that "he may recommend to their consideration
such measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient." ' On
the motion of Gouverneur Morris, however, the phrase "he may"
was struck and the word "and" was inserted before the word
"recommend," thereby yoking together the State of the Union and
Recommendation Clauses."5 The purpose of this change was "to
make it the duty of the President to recommend, & thence prevent
umbrage or cavil at his doing it .... "3 It is therefore not surprising
that George Washington, President of the Philadelphia Convention
of 1787, thought that the Recommendation Clause was mandatory.
In his first Inaugural Address in 1789, he observed: "By the article
establishing the executive department it is made the duty of the
President 'to recommend to your consideration such measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient. s7
A President must take the executive duty principle of the State
of the Union and Recommendation Clauses seriously. A President
who flouted the executive duty of these clauses would properly be
subject to impeachment,"' no less than a President who flouted the
executive duty, contained in the same paragraph of Article II, to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ...
he shall judge necessary and expedient') (footnote omitted).
34. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 185.
35. Id. at 405.
36. Id.
37. First Inaugural Address of George Washington (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted in 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 52 (J. Richardson ed., 1897)
[hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS] (emphasis added).
38. See Laurence H. Tribe, Defining 'High Crimes and Misdemeanors"." Basic Principles,
67 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 712, 717 (1999) ("A President who completely neglects his duties by
showing up at work intoxicated every day, or by lounging on the beach rather than signing
bills or delivering a State of the Union address, would be guilty of no crime but would
certainly have committed an impeachable offense."). During a discussion on the House floor
in 1842, Representative Cushing explained:
The clause requiring the President to see to the execution of the laws, and to
give information to Congress of the state of the Union, was imperative on the
President, and constituted an obligation, by the omission of which he violated
the Constitution and his oath of office, and was liable for impeachment; and if
the Constitution or laws did not set forth the manner in which a duty was to be
performed, it was for the President to decide upon it.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Seas. 482 (1842) (statement of Rep. Cushing).
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
20021
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Finally, one should be careful about reading the State of the
Union and Recommendation Clauses by negative implication.
Arguments from expressio unius est exclusio alterius4 ° must be
contextually and sensitively applied to avoid wooden readings of the
Constitution.4' Because the clauses define the contours of executive
duty, they do not limit what the President may do voluntarily when
exercising the powers of her office. Surely the President may give
more information to Congress than information concerning the
State of the Union, but not less;42 surely the President may do so
more frequently than from time to time, but not less.4 In addition,
one should not assume that others-say, the President's sub-
ordinates within the executive department-may not also give
information to Congress or recommend measures to them, at least
with the President's consent. Nor should one assume that the State
of the Union and Recommendation Clauses are the only clauses in
the Constitution that require the President to share information
with or make recommendations to the whole or a portion of the
legislative department."
40. "The expression of one is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th
ed. 1999). For classic discussions of the canon, see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 32, 83 (Alexander
Hamilton).
41. See Amar, Some Opinions, supra note 7, at 653 n.30; Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar
Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARv. L. REV.
701, 702-08 & n.6 (1995); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1791, 1815-36 (1998).
42. Two scholars have noted this obvious point. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105
YALE L.J. 483, 488 (1995) ("The Constitution requires the President to report on the 'State of
the Union,' but no one would argue that he is constitutionally disabled from sending messages
to Congress on other subjects.") (footnote omitted).
43. It is a closer question whether the President may recommend unnecessary or
inexpedient measures. One of the authors previously noted in passing that the
Recommendation Clause by negative implication "counsels (if not requires) the President to
avoid trivial or frivolous recommendations to Congress." Sidak, Recommendation Clause,
supra note 7, at 2082. That said, it is difficult to believe that the Recommendation Clause
actulilly requires the President to avoid unnecessary or inexpedient recommendations to
Congress. Silly recommendations are unlikely, however, as the President is interested in
preserving her own dignity vis-k-vis Congress. The President is a repeat player with
Congress, and Congress can always register its dissatisfaction with the President's waste of
its time in many political ways, such as delaying confirmations of presidential appointments
or reducing appropriations for executive departments.
44. The Appointments Clause and the Treaty Clause require the President to share
information with and make recommendations to the Senate.
[The President) shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
2002] THE LEGISLATOR-IN-CHIEF 13
B. "From Time to Time" The Periodicity Principle
The phrase "from time to time" is the font of the periodicity
principle. The State of the Union Clause provides that the President
shall exercise the executive duty "from time to time," and one might
plausibly read the Recommendation Clause to provide the same,
although such a reading is not grammatically required. 5
The phrase "from time to time" is used three other times in the
Constitution-in the Journal of Proceedings Clause of Article I,
Section 5" and the Receipts and Expenditures Clause of Article I,
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President) shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur."); cf. RAWLE'S COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 63-64 ("[Wlhen
the treaty is agreed on, the president submits it to the senate, in whose deliberations he takes
no part, but he renders to them, from time to time, such information relative to it as they may
require.").
45. See Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2122 (positing that the phrase
"from time to time" may modify the Recommendation Clause). An interesting question is
whether the duties of the State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses must be exercised
contemporaneously-that is, whether the President must give information when she
recommends, and vice versa. This is a wooden reading of the clauses. One should not, in the
absence of a very clear statement, tie the President's hands in this way. See Jeremy A. Rabkin
& Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the
Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 230 n.131
(1987) (stating that "juxtaposition was not intended by the Framers to limit the presidential
power to recommend measures to the context of giving information on the state of the union").
President Washington, for his part, had no qualms with respect to a "disjunctive" reading of
the State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses. He invoked the Recommendation
Clause in his first Inaugural Address of April 30, 1789, but did not invoke the State of the
Union Clause. See First Inaugural Address of George Washington (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted
in MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 37, at 51-54. He also made
recommendations to Congress at times other than the annual State of the Union Message. See
id. at 57-63 (presenting President Washington's "Special Messages" to Congress for the period
May 25, 1789 to Sept. 29, 1789).
46. According to the Journal of Proceedings Clause:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
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Section 947 to delineate the frequency of a legislative duty, and
in the Vesting Clause of Article III, Section 14' to delineate the
frequency of a legislative power.49
The phrase "from time to time" might plausibly mean at least
once a year, or, more precisely, at least once during every session of
Congress. These two meanings were nearly synonymous at the
Founding, as evidenced by Article I, Section 4, Clause 2, which
provides that "The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December;
unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." 0 The State of
the Union and Recommendation Clauses therefore establish a
constitutional minimum of an annual duty. Not surprisingly,
President George Washington's first State of the Union Message
was simply titled "First Annual Address."51 A short typology of
eighteenth-century official presidential rhetoric is useful. The
"Annual Message," as the State of the Union Message was known,
was a particular type of "Message to Congress," which in turn was
one of three kinds of "official rhetoric" by early presidents.5 2
47. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (*No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.").
48. Id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
49. In one elegant variation on the phrase "from time to time," the Constitution provides:
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of
its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do
Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and
under such Penalties as each House may provide.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
50. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
51. First Annual Address of George Washington (Jan. 8, 1790), in MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 37, at 65-67. The term "State of the Union Message" did not
emerge until the middle of the twentieth century. For most of the nation's history, the
President's exercise of duty under the State of the Union Clause was simply referred to as the
"Annual Message," See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Annual Messages of the Presidents: Mojor
Themes of American History, Introduction to 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at xiii (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966) [hereinafter Schlesinger, Major
Themes]; see also The State of the Union Address, at http://www.senate.gov/-boxer/archive/
stateofunion/history.htm (noting that the term "State of the Union Address" originated in
1945) (last visited Sept. 28, 2002).
52. See JEFFREY K TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 45-59 (1987) (discussing
"Inaugural Addresses," "Proclamations," and "Messages to Congress').
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Interestingly, these clauses were drafted against the backdrop
of the British practice whereby the Monarch would open each
session of Parliament with a "Speech from the Throne. 53 Article
XIX of the New York Constitution of 1777 reflected this British
practice by providing that "it shall be the duty of the governor to
inform the legislature, at every session, of the condition of the State,
so far as may respect his department."54 So too, Alexander
Hamilton's private, unadopted draft of the Constitution provided:
The President at the beginning of every meeting of the
Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to business,
shall convene them together at the place where the Senate shall
sit, and shall communicate to them all such matters as may be
necessary for their information, or as may require their
consideration.55
The evolutionary link to the King's Speech thus explains the
timing of the annual State of the Union Message. President
Washington gave the first State of the Union Message on January
8, 1790, a few days after the First Congress assembled for its second
session on the first Monday in January.56 Today the State of the
Union Message is usually given by the middle of January, shortly
after the opening of the first session of the new Congress.57 In
addition to ceremonial custom, there is a natural functional reason
why the State of the Union Message is given at this time:
Information of the State of the Union is a necessary precondition for
wise public deliberation and legislation by members of Congress.5"
53. See generally 3 WILLIAM STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 477-80
(Clarendon Press 1880) (outlining the role of the Monarch).
54. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX, in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
29, at 1335 (emphasis added).
55. 3 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 624 (emphasis added).
56. President Washington did not give a State of the Union Message after the First
Congress assembled for its first session on March 4, 1789. Tulis observes that "Washington's
.first Inaugural Address served also as his first Annual Message." TULIS, supra note 52, at 55.
Notwithstanding this statement, President Washington and history have considered his "First
Annual Message' to have been delivered on January 8, 1790. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text.
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law
appoint a different day.").
58. See 1 BLACSTONE'S CoMMENTARIEs wrT NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION
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The phrase "from time to time," however, should mean
something more than "at least once during every session of
Congress." The phrase is to be interpreted flexibly because it was
impossible for the Framers to specify all of the times that would give
rise to the duty of the clauses. 9 The phrase may simply mean "when
necessary. "  One can also take an important textual clue from the
juxtaposition of the State of the Union and Recommendation
Clauses with the Special Session Clause, which provides that
"Ithe President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
Houses, or either of them ... A special session of Congress calls
for heightened sensitivity to the State of the Union and
Recommendation Clauses. As William Rawle put it in his treatise
on the Constitution, the President, on such an extraordinary
occasion, "would not be guiltless to his constituents if he failed to
exhibit on the first opportunity, his own impressions of what it
would be useful to do, with his information of what had been
done."62 One may even interpret the phrase to require the President
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GovERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA, app. at 344 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1996) (1803)
(hereinafter Tuc 's COMMENTARiEs]. According to Tucker:
[Als it is indispensably necessary to wise deliberations and mature decisions,
that they should be founded upon correct knowledge of facts, and not upon
presumptions, which are often false, and always unsatisfactory; the constitution
has made it the duty of the supreme executive functionary, to lay before the
federal legislature, a state of such facts as may be necessary to assist their
deliberations on the several subjects confided to them by the constitution.
Id.
James Madison put the point more generally in The Federalist No. 53 when he wrote that
"No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound
judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 332 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
59. Cf U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his
Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period
for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.") (emphasis added); id. art. III, § 1 ("The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.') (emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 186 ("The Judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary,
from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.').
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
62. RAwLE'S COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 172. President Jefferson delivered his third
State of the Union Message in 1803 and his seventh in 1807 upon calling a special session of
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to communicate to Congress as new information of the State of the
Union becomes known to her. For example, President Jefferson
closed his sixth State of the Union Message by promising to
communicate certain pieces of information "from time to time as
they become known to me, with whatever other information I possess
or may receive, which may aid your deliberations on the great
national interests committed to your charge. 6
C. "Give to the Congress": The Publicity Principle
The phrase "give to the Congress" is the font of the publicity
principle." The word "give" in the State of the Union Clause
arguably implies a duty of personal appearance by the President
when giving the State of the Union Message. The personal appear-
ance of the President before Congress is an important symbol that
the President is not a King ruling from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
Ironically, the paradigm case of the King's Speech is instructive.
The King's Speech was usually given by the King in the House of
Lords, where members of the House of Lords and the House of
Commons gathered.'s So too, the first State of the Union Message
Congress. See Third Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1803), reprinted in 1 THE
STATE OFTHE UNION MESSAGESOFTHEPRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 68 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966)
(hereinafter THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES]; Seventh Annual Message of Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 27, 1807), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra at 89.
President Madison did the same in his third and sixth State of the Union Messages, delivered
in 1811 and 1814, respectively. See Third Annual Message of James Madison (Nov. 5, 1811),
reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra at 111; Sixth Annual Message of
James Madison (Sept. 20, 1814), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OFTHE UNION MESSAGES, supra at
129.
63. Sixth Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 2, 1806), reprinted in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 89 (emphasis added). Indeed, President Jefferson
regularly promised to give additional information during the course of the session. See Fourth
Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 8, 1804), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 77; Fifth Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 3, 1805),
reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 83; Seventh Annual
Message of Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 27, 1807), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 94.
64. Cf Amar, Some Opinions, supra note 7, at 670-72 (discussing probity and publicity
principles of Opinion Clause).
65. See George Kamberelis, Genre as Institutionally Informed Social Practice, 6 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 132 (1995) (citation omitted); Pomp and Ceremony. The
Monarch in Parliament, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/lj/churchlj/pomp_01.shtml (last
visited Sept. 15, 2002).
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was given by President Washington in the chamber of the Senate,
where members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
gathered.'
Consider also in this regard Article III, Section 10 of Alexander
Hamilton's private, unadopted draft of the Constitution:
The President at the beginning of every meeting of the
Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to business,
shall convene them together at the place where the Senate shall
sit, and shall communicate to them all such matters as may be
necessary for their information, or as may require their
consideration. He may by message during the Session
communicate all other matters which may appear to him
proper.67
If this clause represents the view of the Framers as a whole-as
opposed to Hamilton's idiosyncratic view-the President's personal
appearance would seem to be constitutionally required, at least in
the annual, ceremonial State of the Union Message. It would not
make sense for the Members of Congress to "convene ... together" in
the Senate Chamber if the President were not to appear personally
before them-they could just as easily read the State of the Union
Message in their separate Houses. Moreover, the phrase "by
message" in the discretionary part of the clause but not in the
mandatory part of the clause suggests that personal appearance is
required for the annual, ceremonial State of the Union Message, but
not for other communications made during the session of Congress."
Other evidence from the Philadelphia Convention of 1787
confirms that other Framers considered a State of the Union
Speech. An early note from the Committee of Detail provided that
the President "[sihall propose to the Legisle. from Time to Time by
Speech or Messg such Meas as concern this Union.'
66. See The First State of the Union Address, at http:/www.earlyamerica.com/
earlyamerica/firsts/sou/text.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2002).
67. 3 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 624.
68. See RAWLE'S COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 172-73 ("These communications were
formerly made in person at the opening of the session, and written messages were
subsequently sent when necessary, but the whole is now done in writing.").
69. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 145.
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True to British practice, Presidents George Washington and
John Adams both personally appeared before Congress in delivering
the first twelve State of the Union Messages.70 President Thomas
Jefferson, however, broke with the tradition of personal, oral
appearance in 1801, because he felt that it was "too kingly for the
new republic."71 He began a practice of delivering by messenger his
annual Messages in writing, although he had clerks read his
Message aloud in each House of Congress.72 This practice lasted
through the next twenty-four presidencies until President Woodrow
Wilson resumed the original tradition of oral delivery in 1913."3 This
break with convention caused some commotion, with one leading
Senator stating, "I am sorry to see revived the old Federalistic
custom of speeches from the throne .... I regret this cheap and
tawdry imitation of English royalty. "' Three Republican presidents
following President Wilson did not embrace the original tradition:
President Warren Harding only followed President Wilson's
example twice, President Calvin Coolidge once, and President
Herbert Hoover not at all.75 Beginning with President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, however, all presidents have embraced the original
British and early American tradition of personal, oral delivery of the
State of the Union Message.76
One might dare say that President Jefferson and the next
twenty-four presidents acted in an unconstitutional fashion, at least
slightly.17 Constitutional requirements aside, however, the publicity
principle of the State of the Union Clause makes for good public
70. 3 STORY'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 1555; From Time to Time: History of the
State of the Union, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/history.html (last visited
Sept. 11, 2002) [hereinafter From Time to Time].
71. From Time to Time, supra note 70.
72. Then-Professor Woodrow Wilson surmised that President Jefferson did so because he
was a poor orator. See WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE § 1335, at 546 (rev. ed. 1902).
73. See From Time to Time, supra note 70. Tulis notes that President Wilson "did not
revive the practice of reply." TULIS, supra note 52, at 56 n.55.
74. Schlesinger, Major Themes, supra note 51, at xvi (quoting Sen. John Sharp Williams
of Mississippi).
75. Id. at xvii.
76. See The State of the Union Message, at http:J/www.clinton4.nara.gov/WH/
SOTU00/history/address.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002).
77. At least one other scholar agrees that the State of the Union Clause mandates some
personal appearance. See MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 50 (1990).
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policy. President Wilson explained why he thought personal ap-
pearance was important:
I am very glad indeed to have this opportunity to address the
two Houses directly and to verify for myself the impression that
the President of the United States is a person, not a mere
department of the Government hailing Congress from some
isolated island ofjealous power, sending messages, not speaking
naturally and with his own voice-that he is a human being
trying to cooperate with other human beings in a common
service. After this pleasant experience, I shall feel quite normal
in all our dealings with one another.78
President William Howard Taft thought that the personal ap-
pearance of the President and the principal officers of the executive
department before Congress would foster public accountability. He
proposed in his fourth State of the Union Message in 1912 that
Cabinet members be required by statute "to introduce measures, to
advocate their passage, to answer questions, and to enter into the
debate" in each House of Congress because it "would stimulate the
head of each department by the fear of public and direct inquiry into
a more thorough familiarity with the actual operations of his
department and into a closer supervision of its business."79
Most importantly, the publicity principle transcends the
personal appearance of the President before Congress. The annual
State of the Union Message is an important channel of communi-
cation between the President and We the People.' As early as 1823,
President James Monroe in his seventh State of the Union Message
talked about the fact that the President was communicating with
We the People as well as the Congress:
The people being with us exclusively the sovereign, it is
indispensable that full information be laid before them on all
important subjects, to enable them to exercise that high power
with complete effect. If kept in the dark, they must be
78. Schlesinger, Major Themes, supra note 51, at xvi (quoting President Woodrow Wilson).
79. Wuxim HowARD TAFr, OUR ClIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS Pow as 31 (1916).
80. A similar publicity principle, or public education principle, exists in the Senate's role
in confirming presidential appointees, including Justices to the Supreme Court. See J.
Gregory Sidak, True God of the Next Justice, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 46 (2001).
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incompetent to it.... To the people every department of the
Government and every individual in each are responsible, and
the more full their information the better they can judge of the
wisdom of the policy pursued and of the conduct of each in
regard to it. From their dispassionate judgment much aid may
always be obtained, while their approbation will form the
greatest incentive and most gratifying reward for virtuous
actions, and the dread of their censure the best security against
the abuse of their confidence. 81
The State of the Union Message has long been directly disseminated
to the People by the press. Historian Charles Beard observed that
the annual State of the Union Message is
the one great public document of the United States which is
widely read and discussed. Congressional debates receive scant
notice, but the President's message is ordinarily printed in full
in nearly every metropolitan daily, and is the subject of general
editorial comment throughout the length and breadth of the
land. It stirs the country: it often affects Congressional elections;
and it may establish grand policy.8'
Twentieth-century presidents made the annual State of the
Union Message an even more public event. President Calvin
Coolidge was the first President to use radio for a State of the Union
Message in 1923.' President Harry Truman was the first President
to use television for a State of the Union Message in 1947."
President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 began the modern practice of
delivering the State of the Union Message in the evening so as to
attract a larger television audience.' President George W. Bush
was the first President to use the Internet for a live presentation of
the State of the Union Message in 2 0 0 2 .6 Most recently, the Bush
81. Seventh Annual Message of James Monroe (Dec. 2, 1823), reprinted in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 202.
82. Fred L. Israel, Preface to 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS:
1790-1966, at V (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966) (quoting historian Charles Beard).
83. See From Time to Time, supra note 70.
84. Id.
85. John F. Yarbrough, Stand and Deliver, at http//abcnews.go.con/sections/us/
PoliticalNation/pn.jfy-stateofunion.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2002).
86. See 2002 State of the Union, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion (last
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Administration reported: "[Tihe State of the Union gives the
President an opportunity to reflect on the past while presenting us
hopes for the future to Congress, the American people and the
world.8 7
D. "Information of the State of the Union": The Public Deliberation
Principle
The phrase "Information of the State of the Union" is the font of
the public deliberation principle. The purpose of the phrase is for
the President to inform Congress so that it may wisely deliberate on
public affairs. Two features of the phrase merit attention: (1) the
meaning of the phrase and (2) the imposition of this duty upon the
President. We address these two features in turn.
1. The Meaning of "Information of the State of the Union"
Consider the first word of the phrase-"Information." This word
connotes facts, not opinions.s The President is required to faithfully
and fully report facts to Congress. Early commentators underscored
the factual nature of the President's duty under the State of the
visited Sept. 15, 2002).
87. See From Time to Time, supra note 70.
88. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S II NEW RivFmsmE UNwvEsrrY DICTIONARY 628 (1988) (defining
"information" as "knowledge of a particular event or situation: NEWS").
A blinkered intratextual contrast with the word "Opinion" in the Opinion Clause is not
helpful because "Opinion" in this clause means "an evaluation or conclusion based on special
knowledge or expertise"-as in a "medical opinion." Id. at 824. Indeed, the Framers'
understanding was that the President would require his subordinates in the executive
department to give both information and opinions in their opinions. See 2 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (remarks of James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 2
FARRAND, supra note 12, at 80 (remarks of John Rutledge) (discussing Council of Revision and
stating, "The Executive could advise with the officers of State, as of war, finance &c. and avail
himself of their information and opinions"); 1 TuCKER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 58, app.
at 319 (stating that the President "may require all necessary information, as also their
opinions in writing, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices ....");
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 7, at 584 ("[The Opinions Clause empowers the President
to obtain information in writing on government matters precisely so he will be able to issue
binding orders to his subordinates.") (footnote omitted); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 7, at
1207 n.262 ("Tihe Opinion in Writing Clause enables the President to get information
whenever he wants it, in writing, on any subject relating to official duties ....").
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Union Clause. St. George Tucker in his "American Blackstone"
stated:
[AS it is indispensably necessary to wise deliberations and
mature decisions, that they should be founded upon the correct
knowledge of facts, and not upon presumptions, which are often
false, and always unsatisfactory; the constitution has made it
the duty of the supreme executive functionary, to lay before the
federal legislature, a state of such facts as may be necessary to
assist their deliberations on the several subjects confided to
them by the constitution. 89
Likewise, Justice Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States linked "facts and information" in
his discussion of the State of the Union Clause: "There is great
wisdom, therefore, in not merely allowing, but in requiring, the
president to lay before congress all facts and information, which
may assist their deliberations."' President Franklin Pierce in his
fourth State of the Union Message in 1856 stated:
While performing his constitutional duty in this respect, the
President does not speak merely to express personal convictions,
but as the executive minister of the Government, enabled by his
position and called upon by his official obligations to scan with
an impartial eye the interests of the whole and every part of the
United States.91
Importantly, the State of the Union Clause commands that the
President provide Congress not just any information but that "of the
State of the Union.' 9 What did the Framers mean by this qualifying
phrase? One obvious, plausible interpretation is that the phrase
"Information of the State of the Union" is an elegant variation of the
phrase "Information on the Condition of the Country." The word
"State" in the State of the Union Clause obviously does not refer to
89. 1 TUCKER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 58, app. at 344 (emphasis added).
90. 3 STORY'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 1555 (emphasis added).
91. Fourth Annual Message of Franklin Pierce (Dec. 2, 1856), reprinted in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 918 (emphasis added).
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
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a political unit, but to status.93 Once again, the precursors to the
State of the Union Clause are illuminating. An early draft of the
State of the Union Clause by the Committee of Detail provided: "It
shall be his Duty to inform the Legislature of the Condition of U.S.
so far as may respect his Department ... 
The question remains as to the scope of the phrase "of the State
of the Union." True to purpose, the phrase properly embraces the
public affairs of the United States, including both domestic and
foreign matters. President John Tyler, in concluding his fourth
State of the Union Message in 1844, wrote, "I have thus, gentlemen
of the two Houses of Congress, presented you a true and faith-
ful picture of the condition of public affairs, both foreign and
domestic."95 President James K Polk likewise wrote in his third
State of the Union Message in 1847 that "it is again my duty to
communicate with Congress upon the state of the Union and the
present condition of public affairs."'6 William Rawle, in his treatise
on the Constitution, elaborated on the President's duty to provide
information to the Congress on foreign affairs:
It is the duty of the president from time to time to give congress
information of the state of the union; but although this alone is
expressly mentioned in the Constitution, his communications
naturally embrace a wider scope than internal affairs. Under the
expression he is to receive ambassadors, the president is charged
with all transactions between the United States and foreign
nations, and he is, therefore, the regular channel through which
the legislature becomes informed of the political situation of the
United States in its foreign, as well as its domestic relations; yet
it has been always understood that he is not required to
communicate more than, in his apprehension, may be consistent
with the public interests.97
93. See WEBSIER'SIINEwRvERSIDEUNIVERSITYDICTIONARY 1133(1988)(defining"state"
as "[a] condition or mode of existence"). State and status descend from the same Latin root.
94. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 158 (emphasis added).
95. Fourth Annual Message of John Tyler (Dec. 3, 1844), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 630.
96. Third Annual Message of James K Polk (Dec. 7, 1847), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF
THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 700.
97. RAwLE'S COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 171.
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Professor Calabresi and Rhodes have suggested in passing that
the obligation of the State of the Union Clause is "only on general
matters such as the circumstances of the whole country.' °  We
respectfully disagree. The State of the Union Clause calls for
detailed reporting on the public affairs of the United States so that
Congress may properly exercise its legislative power. It is important
to remember that Congress had no vast legislative-investigative
apparatus at the Founding and would rely on the President and her
subordinates for all such information." Alexander Hamilton's The
Federalist No. 72 is consistent with an expectation of the Framers
that the Congress would have a comparative disadvantage relative
to the President in the gathering and evaluation of information.
Hamilton explained:
The administration of government, in its largest sense, com-
prehends all the operations of the body politic, whether
legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual and
perhaps in its most precise signification, it is limited to executive
details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive
department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the
preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement
of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations
of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the
direction of the operations of war-these, and other matters
of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly
understood by the administration of government.1"
98. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 7, at 1207 n.262.
99. One of us has previously observed:
To be sure, Congress also has the means to compile information. In addition to
its power to conduct hearings, the current Congress has information-gathering
arms such as the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research
Service, and the Office of Technology Assessment. But at the time of Jefferson's
administration, Congress had to rely extensively on the information and
recommendations of the President and his department heads, for Congress had
no staff and its members did not even have offices.
Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2087.
100. THE FEDERALISTNO. 72, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
William Rawle subsequently gave a similar assessment:
Exercising his office during the recess of the legislature, the members of which,
when they return to the mass of citizens, are disengaged from the obligatory
inspection of public affairs; supplied by his high functions, with the best means
of discovering the public exigencies, and promoting the public good, he would not
be guiltless to his constituents if he failed to exhibit on the first opportunity, his
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Treasury functions, in particular, weigh strongly in favor of
detailed reporting by the President. The Receipts and Expenditures
Clauses of Article I, Section 9 provides: "No money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time."1°1 Although the First Congress passed a law (with the
approval of the President) requiring the Secretary of the Treasury
to report directly to Congress,"° it is far from clear that such a
law is constitutional, strictly speaking. '0 The President is the
Treasurer-in-Chief, and the State of theUnion Clause, when read
in conjunction with the Receipts and Expenditures Clause, requires
that the President give to Congress detailed information about the
public moneys, or authorize her subordinates to do so.' 0 '
own impressions of what it would be useful to do, with his information of what
had been done. He will then have discharged his duty, and it will rest with the
legislature to act according to their wisdom and discretion.
RAWLE's COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 172; see also id. at 52 (stating that "Itlhe president
comes into daily contact with the people, by his daily executive functions").
101. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, c. 7. The Framers thought the office of Treasurer to be very
important because the Treasurer would be the keeper of the public monies. The office was
important enough to provide Congress with the Article I, Section 8 power of appointing the
Treasurer by joint ballot in both the draft of the Constitution referred to the Committee of
Style and its report. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 570 (draft referred to Committee of
Style) (stating Congress shall have power 't o appoint a Treasurer by joint ballot"); id. at 594
(report of Committee of Style, first provision of Article I, § 8) ("The Congress may by joint
ballot appoint a treasurer."). This provision was intended to be the lone exception to the power
of appointing officers of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. However, it was subsequently deleted on September 14, 1787, just
three days before the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 completed its business. See 2 FARRAND,
supra note 12, at 614.
102. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (establishing the Department of the
Treasury and requiring the Secretary of Treasury "to make report, and give information to
either branch of the legislature, in person or in writing (as he may be required), respecting
all matters referred by him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall
appertain to his office"). For diverse analyses of the Appropriations Clause and the Receipts
and Expenditures Clause, see Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343
(1988) and J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1162.
103. For examples of recent statutes requiring executive officers of the United States to
report to Congress or either House, see Golove, supra note 41, at 1856-57 n.202.
104. See also Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1340 (1999) (stating
that "[tihe President is subject to several constitutional requirements of reporting and
disclosure," including the State of the Union Clause and Receipts and Expenditures Clause).
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Early practice is illuminating. Since the First Congress, con-
gresses have vested the President with substantial discretion with
respect to appropriations. In Clinton v. City of New York,' 5 the Line
Item Veto Act case, Justice Scalia recently explained:
From a very early date Congress also made permissive
individual appropriations, leaving the decision whether to spend
the money to the President's unfettered discretion. In 1803, it
appropriated $50,000 for the President to build "not exceeding
fifteen gun boats, to be armed, manned and fitted out, and
employed for such purposes as in his opinion the public service
may require," Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 11, §3, 2 Stat. 206.
President Jefferson reported that "[tihe sum of fifty thousand
dollars appropriated by Congress for providing gun boats
remains unexpended. The favorable and peaceable turn of affairs
on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of that law
unnecessary," 13 Annals of Cong. 14 (1803)."~
There would be a practical need-and constitutional duty-for the
President to report to Congress whether and to what extent that
discretion was in fact exercised. The hard question is whether
the President also has a constitutional duty to report a plan of
revenue-a national budget-in addition to a statement and account
of receipts and expenditures. The Framers may have well expected
the President to do so. Gouverneur Morris's proposal for a Privy
Council provided:
The Secretary of Commerce and Finance who shall also be
appointed by the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty
to superintend all matters relating to the public finances, to
prepare & report plans of revenue and for the regulation of
expenditures, and also to recommend such things as may in his
Judgment promote the commercial interests of the U.S.1"'
105. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
106. Id. at 466-67. For another interesting and earlier example, see Act of July 1, 1790, ch.
22, § 1, 1 Stat. 128, 129 (1790) (appropriating funds for foreign affairs) ("ITMhe President shall
account specifically for all such expenditures of the said money as in his judgment may be
made public, and also for the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not
to specify.").
107. 2 FARtAND, supra note 12, at 343.
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A cursory examination of early State of the Union Messages reveals
that presidents routinely reported (or committed to report) national
budgets-as well as statements and accounts of receipts and
expenditures."° Subsequent history, however, clouds the issue. The
Constitution of the Confederate States of America, drafted in
Birmingham, Alabama in February of 1861, closely tracked the
United States Constitution in nearly all respects, yet specifically
created an implied executive duty to prepare a national budget.'
If the Framers of the Confederate Constitution believed that a
specific provision was necessary, it is possible that the prevailing
interpretation seventy-one years after the ratification was that the
United States Constitution did not impose such a duty on the
President." °
If we take the public deliberation principle seriously, the
President must provide detailed information to Congress under the
State of the Union Clause-at least enough detail for Congress to go
about the nation's legislative business. A State of the Union speech
may be necessary under the publicity principle, but not sufficient
under the public deliberation principle, because a speech could not
possibly convey all necessary information in any but the smallest
Athenian republic. The President would thus need to supplement a
speech with detailed information in writing. Not surprisingly, this
was the first practice. President Washington concluded his first
State of the Union Message by stating, "I have directed the proper
officers to lay before you, respectively, such papers and estimates as
108. See, e.g., Fourth Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 8, 1804), reprinted in 1
THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 77 ("Accounts of the receipts and
expenditures of the last year, with estimates for the ensuing one, will as usual be laid before
you.").
109. This positive executive duty was by implication because, in the absence of a
supermajority vote of both houses, the Confederate Framers limited congressional
appropriations to amounts budgeted by the Confederate President: "Congress shall
appropriate no money from the Treasury except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses, taken
by yeas and nays, unless it be asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of
departments and submitted to Congress by the President ...." CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE
STATES art. I, § 9, cl. 9, reprinted in 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF JEFFERSON DAVIS AND
THE CONFEDERACY, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, 1861-1865, at 37,43-44 (James
D. Richardson ed., 1905).
110. It is possible that the Confederate Constitution merely clarified the prevailing
understanding of this clause in the U.S. Constitution. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional
Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 15-21 (1998) (discussing
declaratory and clarifying amendments in the Bill of Rights).
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regard the affairs particularly recommended to your consideration,
and necessary to convey to you that information of the state of the
Union which it is my duty to afford.""'
2. The Imposition of the Duty upon the President
Why is the duty to give information of the State of the Union
given to the President? Professor Jay Bybee has observed that "[the
[State of the Union] Clause presupposes that the President would
have information regarding the state of the Union and that the
information would be known only to him, or at least that Congress
would not possess it.""2 This observation is appealing, and there is
more to be said.
As is true of many a constitutional provision, there is a
powerful geographic and logistical theme' lurking behind the
presupposition that the President has a special institutional
competence with respect to "Information of the State of the Union,"
and indeed all of Article II.1" Like Citibank, the President never
111. First Annual Message of George Washington (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 4. Jeffrey Tulis, discussing early official
presidential rhetoric, has written that "[olften appended to a Special Message [such as an
Annual Message) was a detailed technical report from an executive department." TULIS, supra
note 52, at 55. Recent practice is amusing: President Nixon purportedly broke with precedent
in his State of the Union Message in 1972 by delivering to Congress two Messages-a short
4,000-word speech for his television audience and a 15,000-word document for his
congressional audience. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, NIXON: THE THIRD YEAR OF HIS
PRESIDENCY 1 (1972).
112. Bybee, supra note 7, at 104.
113. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 443, 469-71 (1989) ("Geography preoccupied the founding
generation .... [It] ramified in every direction, influencing virtually every major issue
considered by the Philadelphia Convention ...."); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is
the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REv. 113, 125 (1995) ("Where to
locate various government personnel and institutions obsessed those who wrote and ratified
the Constitution, largely because location does affect (and did so much more in 1787) the
smooth running of government.").
114. For an economics-oriented account of the President's institutional competence in
information collection, see Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2086-87 (offering
principal-agent problem rationale). The "economic" explanation need not be considered as a
different account than the structural account discussed in the text. Rather, it explains with
a different set of analytical tools the behavior and choices of the Framers and, ultimately, the
rules they laid down in the Constitution. So viewed, the economic approach is being
originalist/interpretivist in its own way. The Federalist is rife with economic depictions of
human motivation, as in The Federalist No. 10 on factions and in Hamilton's several essays
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sleeps: The President is the only constitutional actor who must be
on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, fifty-two weeks
a year." 5 By contrast, we are sometimes, and at the Founding were
oftentimes, without a Congress. Recall that Article I, Section 4,
Clause 2 provides that "[tihe Congress shall assemble at least once
in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in
December; unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day."
116
Similarly, it has been noted that "in the early Republic, Americans
expected that [federal] legislators would typically meet in short
sessions and quickly return back home to live (like everyone else)
under the laws just made.""7 This point is reinforced by considering
the President's Commander-in-Chiefresponsibilities.S Even in the
absence of a standing army, the nation could never be without a
Chief Commander, as defense of the nation could be required at any
on executive action. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), Nos. 69-76 (Alexander
Hamilton).
115. We are never without a President, or to the extent there is any difference, an "Acting
President." See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amends. XX, XXV; see also Amar & Amar,
supra note 113, at 126 ("The President and the executive officers who serve beneath him are
on duty-in office-without break or interruption, 365 days a year."); Amar & Katyal, supra
note 41, at 713 (1995) ('Unlike federal lawmakers and judges, the President is at 'Session'
twenty-four hours a day, every day. Constitutionally speaking, the President never sleeps.").
A similar principle animates the Guarantee Clause of Article IV. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, §
4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence."). This clause presumes that the State's executive authority never sleeps, unlike its
legislative authority.
116. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see also id. amend. XX, § 2. The Arrest
Clause of Article I reflects the fact that Members of Congress would not always be seated at
the Seat of Government: "The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance
at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same ...."
Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. And the Army Clause of Article I also reflects a similar principle. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (establishing that Congress shall have Power "[tlo raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years"); 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 509 (remarks of Roger Sherman) ("As the Legislature
is to be biennally [sic) elected, it would be inconvenient to require appropriations to be for one
year, as there might be no Session within the time necessary to renew them."). Even the
modern Constitution recognizes that Members of Congress would not always be seated at the
Seat of Government. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
117. Amar & Amar, supra note 113, at 126.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States....") (emphasis added).
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moment. One recognition by the Framers of this fact is that they
empowered the States to wage a defensive war in the event of an
attack by a foreign power, on the rationale that word might not
travel fast enough for the federal government to launch a defense.'19
This awareness of urgency is evidence in the Framers' minds of the
need for presidential vigilance.
One leading Framer noted the President's institutional
competence in information collection. At the Pennsylvania rati-
fying convention, James Wilson justified the President's veto power
in part by observing that the President "will have before him the
fullest information of our situation; he will avail himself not only of
records and official communications, foreign and domestic, but he
will have also the advice of the executive officers in the different
departments of the general government.""2 The President would
also have the advice of the executive authorities of the several
States as well, a point which underscores the executive's institu-
tional competence in information collection vis-&-vis the legislature.
The report of the Committee of Detail included a clause, juxtaposed
with the President's duty to receive ambassadors, 121 providing that
the President "may correspond with the supreme Executives of the
several States."122 This clause was rejected by the Framers "as
unnecessary and implying that he could not correspond with
others."'23 Early commentators on the Constitution also appreciated
the geographical and logistical underpinnings of Article II. St.
George Tucker wrote, "As from the nature of the executive office it
possesses more immediately the sources, and means of information
than the other departments of government . Justice Story
similarly observed that "[firom the nature and duties of the
executive department, he must possess more extensive sources of
119. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Constitution provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Id.
120. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 88, at 448.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
122. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 185.
123. Id. at 419 (motion of Gouverneur Morris).
124. 1 TUCKER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 58, app. at 344.
20021
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
information, as well in regard to domestic as foreign affairs, than
can belong to congress. " '
The Constitution's assignment of legislative powers to the
President resembles vertical integration within a firm. Vertical
integration enables a firm to coordinate investment and production
decisions. A comparison of the costs of contractual exchange with
those of internal exchange often reveals vertical integration to
be the least-cost alternative to achieving the desired level of
coordination.12 The minimization of coordination costs is extremely
important in a market subject to rapid technical change. It should
likewise be important in political "markets," where change may be
not only technological, but also economic, military, and diplomatic.
The point here is different from Hamilton's famous discourse on
the accountability of a strong, unitary executive.1"' Hamilton was
concerned about the asymmetry of information between the
electorate and their officials at the Seat of Government. A separate
concern is who within the federal government has the best
information to make certain decisions. A related question is the
extent to which that person must be "vertically integrated" into
other governmental functions to see that the information at his
disposal is productively used to formulate policy. The Hamiltonian
unitary executive needs not only unity, but also some degree of
vertical integration across the activities that generate valuable
information and the activities that exploit it for the benefit of the
electorate.
Yet another consideration is opportunism. The transaction
costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts make it prohibitively
costly to write contracts that specify all obligations under all
contingencies. In such circumstances, contracting parties may
engage in opportunistic behavior, which undermines the likelihood
of maximizing joint profits." A high degree of asset specificity gives
rise to "appropriable quasi-rents," which implies that contracting at
125. 3 STORYS COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 1555.
126. For a review of transaction-cost economics, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
MEcHANIsMs OF GoVERNANCE (Oxford University Press 1996). This literature, of course,
descends from Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937).
127. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 69-76 (Alexander Hamilton).
128. The classic explanation of this "hold-up"problem is Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and
Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976).
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arms' length could induce opportunistic behavior.129 Paul Milgrom
and John Roberts note:
In the integrated organization, planning entails consultation
between those who sell the product, those who make it, and
those who supply parts or systems for it. Together they forecast
capacity needs and identify product improvements and
investments in specialized equipment that promise higher
quality or lower production costs. If the investment is highly
specific, vertical integration alleviates the hold-up problem by
eliminating the opportunity to negotiate over the price paid to
the owner of the newly created asset." °
Relative to contracting at arms' length, vertical integration reduces
these costs. The analogy within Article II may be the following: The
President, by virtue of the Hamiltonian "energy" that attends the
executive, 131 acquires the information and experience with which to
formulate improvements in laws. Nevertheless, politicians benefit
from receiving credit for spearheading policy initiatives. In this way,
they earn a return on "investment" in the political equivalent of
innovation or research and development. The President could
contract at arms' length with members of Congress to shre all of
her good legislative insights with them privately, so that those
members could then introduce legislation. However, the analogy to
"production" here is not simply the enactment of a new law; rather,
it is the combination of the enactment and effective execution of
policy embodied in a new law. In this respect, the State of the Union
and Recommendation Clauses are political expressions of the
importance of coordinating investment and production decisions.
129. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
130. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 558
(1992).
131. Alexander Hamilton famously asserted:
Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the
protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of
liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of
anarchy.
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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There are two other structural features of the presidency that
are important to consider. First, recall that one particular worry at
the Founding was that Members of the House of Representatives,
elected biennially, would be ignorant of national affairs and
therefore could not legislate for the benefit of the nation as a
whole."3 2 How could a farmer-legislator13 from Massachusetts be
aware of the state of affairs of Georgia, let alone the state of foreign
affairs?14 The President, by virtue of a four-year term, would be
significantly better acquainted with national affairs. 135 Second,
information collection is a natural by-product of the President's duty
to execute the laws. The State of the Union and Recommendation
Clauses are located in the same paragraph of Article II as the Take
Care Clause. 3 1 One inference to draw from this textual proximity
is a belief among the Framers that executing a particular law,
reporting its efficacy, and recommending ways to improve it are all
closely related. 7 Justice Story strongly hinted at this connection:
The true workings of the laws; the defects in the nature or
arrangements of the general systems of trade, finance, and
justice; and the military, naval, and civil establishments of the
Union, are more readily seen, and more constantly under the
view of the executive, than they can possibly be of any other
department. There is great wisdom, therefore, in not merely
allowing, but in requiring, the president to lay before congress
all facts and information, which may assist their deliberations;
and in enabling him at once to point out the evil, and to suggest
the remedy. He is thus justly made responsible, not merely for
132. See supra notes 99-100, 115-25 and accompanying text.
133. The reference to "farmer-legislator" is no joke. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 200
(remarks of Oliver Ellsworth) ("The summer will interfere too much with private business,
that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or less connected with
agriculture.").
134. See THE FEDERALS'T Nos. 53, 56 (James Madison); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 31 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS!.
135. The Founders recognized the relationship between length of term and expertise. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 377 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (linking six-year
term of Senators with treaty-making power).
136. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
137. See Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2085 (noting this point); id. at
2089 & n.48 (noting that Justice Story made a similar point).
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a due administration of the existing systems, but for due
diligence and examination into the means of improving them. 8'
As we shall see next, the President's duty to recommend legislation
is also tightly paired with the President's duty to execute the laws.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION CLAUSE
The Recommendation Clause shares with the State of the Union
Clause the executive duty principle."' Perhaps the two also share
the periodicity principle, although that case is less persuasive."4
Beyond these principles, four more principles animate the
Recommendation Clause: (i) the anti-royalty principle, (ii) the
closely related popular sovereignty principle, (iii) the legislation
principle, and (iv) the executive discretion principle.
A. "And Recommend to Their Consideration: The Anti-Royalty
and Popular Sovereignty Principles
The phrase "and recommend to their Consideration"141 is the
font of the anti-royalty principle and the closely related popular
sovereignty principle. 42 We address each of these in turn.
1. The Anti-Royalty Principle
The President's recommendations under the Recommendation
Clause are recommendations, not regal edicts. As Justice William
0. Douglas memorably observed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer,"3 "the power to recommend legislation, granted to
the President, serves only to emphasize that it is his function
to recommend and that it is the function of the Congress to
138. 3 STORYS COMMFNTARMES, supra note 9, § 1555.
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
142. Cf Amar, Some Opinions, supra note 7, at 654-55 (discussing the anti-royalty
principle embodied in the Opinion Clause).
143. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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legislate."1" This was not the practice in Great Britain. St. George
Tucker explained:
In England, the laws do, in fact, originate with the executive: a
revenue bill is always proposed by the chancellor of the
exchequer, or some member of that department; and it is
understood to be the practice, that every other measure of
considerable magnitude and importance is first discussed in the
privy council, before it is brought into parliament; where it is
generally introduced, and the bill prepared by some of the
officers of the crown.14
The Recommendation Clause, therefore, stands as yet another
clause in the Constitution repudiating British monarchy.'" The
President stands as an adviser to Congress, not unlike the position
of the Senate vis-&-vis the President in treaty making or the
appointment of officers of the United States. An early resolution by
the Committee of Detail made the President's advisory role
especially clear: "In the President the executive Authority of the
U.S. shall be vested .... He shall have a Right to advise with the
Heads of the different Departments as his Council .... 147
Several presidents have made this point as well. President
Zachary Taylor in his first and only State of the Union Message in
1850 quoted the Vesting Clause of Article I and observed: "The
Executive has the authority to recommend (not to dictate) measures
to Congress."' Professor and future President Woodrow Wilson
144. Id. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring).
145. 1 TUCKER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 58, app. at 324; see also id. app. at 344 ("In
France, under the present constitution, all laws originate with the executive department: than
which, there can not exist a stronger characteristic of a despotic government."). As noted
earlier, the Confederate Constitution moved back in the direction of granting budgetary power
to the executive. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
146. For a useful discussion of the Constitution's repudiation of British monarchy, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of PersonnelF, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1994).
147. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 135 (emphasis added).
148. First Annual Message of Zachary Taylor (Dec. 4, 1849), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF
THE UNION IESSAGES, supra note 62, at 788. Additionally, St. George Tucker noted:
[Tlhis power of recommending any subject to the consideration of congress,
carries no obligation with it. It stands precisely on the same footing, as a
message from the king of England to parliament; proposing a subject for
deliberation, not pointing out the mode of doing the thing which it recommends.
[Vol. 44:1
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wrote that "[a] President's messages to Congress have no more
weight or authority than their intrinsic reasonableness and impor-
tance give them."'49
Although the President's recommendations under the
Recommendation Clause are not binding, this most certainly does
not mean that Congress may blithely ignore them. The Recom-
mendation Clause provides that the President "shall ... recommend
to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient."' ° The word "consider" means to give serious, careful
thought and deliberation.1 1 Just as the President has a duty under
the Recommendation Clause to recommend measures, Congress
has a corresponding duty under the Recommendation Clause to
consider them.5 2 Of course, Congress's duty of consideration of the
recommendations tendered by the President guarantees nothing. As
one of us has previously explained, "Congress must consider the
President's recommendations, just as the Supreme Court must
consider petitions for certiorari; but, like the Court, Congress
need not grant a hearing on a particular matter. Needless to say,
1 TUCKERS COMMENTARIEs, supra note 58, app. at 344.
149. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 72 (1908).
150. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
151. WEBSTER'S II NEW RvERSIDE UNIVERsrrY DICTIONARY 301 (1988) (defining
"consideration" as [c]areful thought: DELIBERATION" and defining "consider" as "[to think
about seriously"); Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2121 (stating that "the
plain meaning of 'consideration' entails contemplation, attentive thought, and reflection)
(citing 3 OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 858 def. 1, 2 (1970)).
152. One of us has previously argued that the Recommendation Clause, either by its terms
or by negative implication, imposes a duty of consideration on Congress. See Sidak,
Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2118 ("[Flor the recommendation clause to amount
to more than precatory verbiage, it implicitly must require Congress to listen to what the
President thinks is important enough to recommend to Congress."); id. at 2121 ("[lit would
defeat the purpose of the recommendation clause for Congress not to have a corresponding
duty to listen."). In subsequent testimony before the Senate, Professor Laurence Tribe has
taken the same position. National Environmental Policy Act and the North American Free
Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 103d
Cong. 11-14 (1993) (testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe) (suggesting that there is a
congressional duty to consider the President's recommendations even though Congress may
decide not to implement any of them). For a contrary view made in passing, see Samuel W.
Cooper, Note, Considering 'Power" in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361, 392 n.206
(1994) (stating that "the Constitution imposes no duty on Congress to pay any attention [to
the President's recommendations]").
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Congress need not take additional steps to transform the President's
recommendations into law." 15
3
A devout textualist would ponder the use of the related
words "reconsider," "reconsidered," and "Reconsideration" in the
Veto Clause to wring the most drops of meaning from the
Recommendation Clause. In the span of 156 words, the Veto Clause
uses "reconsider" or its close variants three times:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it,
but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at
large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the
Bill, it shall be sent together with the Objections, to the other
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But
in all such Cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined
by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and
against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House
respectively.15
It should be obvious that the President's "Objections" to vetoed
legislation are especially important in the process of law making.
These objections are mentioned not once, not twice, but thrice in the
Veto Clause. The President's objections are to be entered on the
journal of the originating House so that they may be made public.'55
The President's objections are to serve as the focal point in the
process of reconsideration. Reconsideration is mandatory-the
originating House "shall ... proceed to reconsider it,"'56 and if the bill
is sent to the other House, it is sent with the President's objections,
where "it shall likewise be reconsidered." 1' James Wilson explained
the significance of the President's objections at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention:
153. Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2121.
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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[Elven if his objections do not prevent its passing into a law,
they will not be useless; they will be kept, together with the law,
and, in the archives of Congress, will be valuable and practical
materials, to form the minds of posterity for legislation. If it is
found that the law operates inconveniently, or oppressively, the
people may discover in the President's objections the source of
that inconvenience or oppression. Further, sir, when objections
shall have been made, it is provided, in order to secure the
greatest degree of caution and responsibility, that the votes of
both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the
names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be
entered in the journal of each house respectively.58
If the President's "last word" on legislation is entitled to such
careful consideration by each House of Congress and, as
importantly, future congresses, why not her "first word" on
legislation, too? The President should not have to smuggle her
recommendations into her objections to vetoed legislation to garner
the consideration of the Congress. One need not extrapolate and
interpolate much from the Veto Clause to recognize that each House
of Congress owes the President's "first word" a degree of
consideration similar to her "last word."
Moreover, the President's "last word" and "first word" are related
in important ways. The President's veto may be considered a kind
of recommendation-and vice versa. Professors Jeremy Rabkin and
Neal Devins hinted at this connection in their statement that the
Veto Clause "presents the veto power not as a mere mechanical
obstacle, but quite specifically as a device for highlighting
presidential policy views on emerging legislation."1" 9 Similarly, the
President's recommendation is a sort of veto-an embryonic veto
warning Congress not to present the President with legislation that
does not comport with the President's legislative agenda unless
Congress can muster a requisite two-thirds supermajority in each
House of Congress."
158. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 88, at 448.
159. Rabkin & Devins, supra note 45, at 230 n.131.
160. See id. at 231 n.131 (referring to a President's recommendation under Recommen-
dation Clause as "advance warning of an intention to veto").
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If one takes the principle of the Veto Clause seriously, one might
surmise that each House of Congress, if it does not approve the
President's recommendations, must give the President its objections
in writing. The British practice was more general: Parliament would
respond to the King's Speech with a written answer.'6 ' It is hence
not surprising that after Washington's First Annual Message
"[flollowing British practice, the president received formal replies to
his address from both houses of Congress." 62 In fact, President
Washington received replies from each House of Congress to whom
the State of the Union Message was addressed, and "Itihe two
replies addressed each point of Washington's speech and thus
constituted a kind of oath on the part of congressmen to do the
virtuous deeds that Washington urged."16 And Washington,
receiving a committee from each House of Congress, then orally
replied to each of these written replies.
164
This early American practice was the cause of some concern.
After President Washington's second State of the Union Message in
1791, Senator Maclay wrote in his diary that:
It was a Stale ministerial Trick in Britain, to get the Houses of
parliament to chime in with the speech, and then consider them
as pledged to support any Measure which could be grafted on the
Speech. It was the Socratic mode of Argument introduced into
politicks, to entrap men into Measures they were not aware of.'65
Indeed, President Jefferson's desire to break this parliamentary
practice influenced his decision to reject the original tradition of
oral, personal delivery of the State of the Union Message. "By
sending a message, instead of making a speech at the opening of the
session," he wrote, "I have prevented the bloody conflict which the
161. TULIS, supra note 52, at 55.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 55-56.
165. William Maclay, Diary Entry (Mar. 17, 1790), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 MARCH, 1789 - 3
MARCH, 1791, at 181 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1988). We thank Professor Currie
for this evidence. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and
the Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 189 (1995).
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making an answer would have committed them. They consequently
were able to be set into real business at once."
166
However, Congress's practice of a written answer to the
President's recommendations has deliberative virtues and ac-
countability benefits, just as do the President's written objections
to vetoed legislation. The practice of replies might be thought to
be empowering and not degrading of Congress, as it "formally
constituted a deliberative relation between the branches and offered
the potential for the exercise of considerable legislative power."17
This was true especially of the opposition party in Congress. In
1809, Representative John Randolph stated:
The answer to an Address, although that answer might
finally contain the most exceptionable passages, was in fact the
greatest opportunity which the opposition to the measures of the
Administration had of canvassing and sifting its measures....
This opportunity of discussion of the answer to an Address,
however exceptionable the answer might be when it had received
the last seasoning for the presidential palate, did afford the best
opportunity to take a review of the measures of the
Administration, to canvass them fully and fairly, without there
being any question raised whether the gentlemen was in order
or not; and I believe the time spent in canvassing the answer to
a speech was at least as well spent as a great deal that we have
expended since we discontinued the practice."'
166. Schlesinger, Major Themes, supra note 51, at xiv (quoting President Thomas
Jefferson); see also TULIS, supra note 52, at 56 (quoting President Thomas Jefferson as stating
that "the custom [of formal replies) was regarded as an English habit, tending to familiarize
the public with monarchical ideas" and that "I have had principal regard to the convenience
of the legislature, to the economy of their time, to their relief from the embarrassment of
immediate answers on subjects not yet fully before them, and to the benefits thence resulting
in public affairs").
167. TuLIs, supra note 52, at 56.
168. Id. at 57 (quoting Rep. Randolph). At least one other legislator expressed a similar
sentiment:
To this speech there was an answer from each house, and those answers
expressed, freely, the sentiments of the house upon all the merits and faults of
the administration.... [President Washington] did not complain of it; he did not
doubt that both houses had a perfect right to comment, with the utmost latitude,
consistent with decorum, upon all his measures. Answers, or amendments to
answer, were not unfrequently proposed, very hostile to his own course of public
policy, if not sometimes bordering on disrespect.
Id. at 57-58 (quoting Sen. Daniel Webster).
2002]
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Justice Story observed, "To the speeches thus made a written
answer was given by each house; and thus an opportunity was
afforded by the opponents of the administration to review its whole
policy in a single debate on the answer."169 The rejection of the
President's recommendations by Congress or either House of
Congress may be considered a congressional veto of sorts. President
James K Polk, defending the President's veto power, made this
precise point in his fourth State of the Union Message in 1848:
When the President recommends measures to Congress, he
avows in the most solemn form his opinions, gives his voice in
their favor, and pledges himself in advance to approve them if
passed by Congress. If he acts without due consideration, or has
been influenced by improper or corrupt motives, or if from any
other cause Congress, or either House of Congress, shall differ
with him in opinion, they exercise their veto upon his
recommendations and reject them; and there is no appeal from
their decision but to the people at the ballot box.'
2. The Popular Sovereignty Principle
The phrase "and recommend to their Consideration""' is also the
font of the popular sovereignty principle. There are powerful
relationships between the President's recommendations under
the Recommendation Clause, the People's petitions under the
Petition Clause of the First Amendment,'72 and the grand jury's
presentments under the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.' Legal scholars have almost completely ignored these
169. 3 STORY'S COMMENTARIE, supra note 9, § 1556 n.1.
170. Fourth Annual Message of James K Polk (Dec. 5, 1848), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF
THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 767.
171. U.S. CONST art. II, § 3.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
173. Id. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger.").
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relationships.17' Four insights emerge from considering these
clauses as a whole.
First, the People's petitions and the grand jury's presentments
are both recommendations of sorts. A petition is a request or
suggestion made to a government body; it is not binding on its
recipient, strictly speaking, although it is entitled to consider-
ation.7 ' A presentment-a type of report by the grand jury typically
exposing wrongdoing by public officials 176-is also nonbinding on its
prosecutor-recipient, strictly speaking, although it too presumably
is entitled to consideration. 7 7 There is also a close relationship
between a petition and a presentment: A presentment is the
paradigmatic type of petition. Grand juries in Great Britain "were
174. Only a few scholars have noted the connection between the Recommendation Clause
and the Petition Clause of the First Amendment-and then only in passing. See Sidak,
Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2119 ('Through his performance of the duty to
recommend measures to Congress, the President functions as the agent of a diffuse electorate
who seek the redress of grievances. To muzzle the President, therefore, is to diminish the
effectiveness of this right expressly reserved to the people under the first amendment."); see
also Bybee, supra note 7, at 105 n.269. According to Professor Bybee:
The Recommendation Clause empowers the President to represent the people
before Congress, by recommending measures for the reform of government, for
the general welfare, or for the redress of grievances. The Right of Petition
Clause prevents Congress from abridging the right of the people to petition for
a redress of grievances.
Id.
175. Indeed, the phrase *petition or suggestion" enjoys a certain pedigree in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. See 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, ch. 4 (1350); N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1787, in
THE COMPLzm BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFrs, DEBATFs, SouRcEs, AND ORIGINs 353 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE CoMPE BILL OF RIGml ("That no Citizen of this State
shall be taken or imprisoned for any Offence upon Petition or Suggestion, unless it be by
Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful Men of the same Neighbourhood where such
Deeds be done, in due Manner, or by due Process of Law.") (emphasis added); see also MASS.
CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIX, in 1 FRANKIN B. HOUGH, AMERICAN CoNsTI'tMrIONS 625
(1872) ("The people have a right ... to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses,
petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they
suffer.") (emphasis added). For the government's duty to consider the People's petitions, see
Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the
Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 155-58 (1986).
176. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 134, at 85 (observing that the grand jury
through the legal device of a presentment, "had sweeping proactive and inquisitorial powers
to investigate suspected wrongdoing or cover-ups by government officials and to make its
findings known ... [in] a public document stating its accusations").
177. See United States v. Hill, 26 F. Cas. 315, 316 (C.C.D. Va. 1809) (No. 15,364)
(Marshall, C.J.) (noting that a grand jury's presentment does not carry with it a duty on the
part of the prosecutor to respond). But see 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 41, 42-43 (1794) (suggesting that
a district attorney should follow the grand jurys lead).
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seen -as the proper body to initiate [petitions] that brought
grievances to the attention of [Parliament],"'78 and not surprisingly,
early grand juries in America styled their presentments as petitions
for the redress of grievances. 7 9
Second, the People's petitions and the grand jury's presentments
are both recommendations of sorts to the President. The Petition
Clause provides for the right of the People "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. " s° The use of the word
"Government" stands in stark contrast to the use of the word
"Congress" as the first word of the same First Amendment;
"Government" is most definitely not a synonym for "Congress."1 '
The word "Government" reflects an understanding that the People
would petition the President or the Congress, just as the People
would petition the King or either House of Parliament.182 In the
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson detailed several
dozen malefactions of King George and then emphasized that the
King had refused the many petitions of the American colonies:
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for
Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have
been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose
character is thus marked by every act which may define a
Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. "53
Plainly, the Framers intended their President not to exhibit the
same tyrannical indifference to the petitions of We the People. It
would, moreover, make more sense for the People to petition their
President: The President is the representative of the People, not
their monarch or regent. As President James K. Polk put it in his
178. Stewart Jay, Servants of Monarchs and Lords: The Advisory Role of Early English
Judges, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118, 130 n.46 (1994) (quoting John Brewer).
179. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 134, at 86-87 & n.18.
180. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
181. James Madison's initial draft of the Petition Clause in the House of Representatives
used the word "legislature," but the House Committee of Eleven Report changed the Petition
Clause to use the word "Government." See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 175, at
129-30.
182. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Congress at New York (Oct. 19, 1765), at 16 (photo.
reprint 1938) (1766) ("That it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies, to petition
the king or either house of parliament.").
183. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
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fourth (and last) State of the Union Message in 1848, "The
President represents in the executive department the whole people
of the United States, as each member of the legislative department
represents portions of them." 18' Moreover, as we have seen, it would
not make sense, for reasons of geography and logistics, for the
People to send petitions to the "Seat of Government of the United
States, c/o The Speaker of the House of Representatives.""s So too
the grand jury's presentments are directed to the President as
Prosecutor-in-Chief for the United States.s 6
Third, the People's petitions and the grand jury's presentments
are both recommendations of sorts to the President that enable the
President to fulfill her executive duties under the State of the Union
184. Schlesinger, Major Themes, supra note 51, at xxxiv (quoting President Polk); see also
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926).
The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the
Senate and the House are, and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that
the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all
than are the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are
local and not countrywide ....
Id. In addition, numerous other authorities noted the President's representative nature. See
Fourth Annual Message of Franklin Pierce (Dec. 2, 1856), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 919 (stating that the President "represents the aggregate
population of the United States" and that the People's election of the President "is the explicit
and solemn act of the sole sovereign authority of the Union"); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
88, at 448 (remarks of James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
[The President] will, under this Constitution, be placed in office as the President
of the whole Union, and will be chosen in such a manner that he may be justly
styled the man of the people. Being elected; by the different parts of the United
States, he will consider himself as not particularly interested for any one of
them, but will watch over the whole with paternal care and affection.
Id.; see also RAWLE'S COMMNTARY, supra note 31, at 164 ("The president himself is elected
on the supposition that he is the most capable citizen to understand and promote [the true
interests of the people], and in every appointment he ought to consider himself as executing
a public trust of the same nature.").
185. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. There is at least one instance in which
a President proactively recommended to the Congress the redress of a would-be petition by
a private citizen. See First Annual Message of Andrew Jackson (Mar. 4, 1829), reprinted in
1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 313-14.
186. On the President as Prosecutor-in-Chief, see, for example, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654,706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes
is a quintessentially executive function."); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 7, at 658-61
(presenting evidence from presidential practice and British tradition to support the argument
that prosecutorial authority is inherently an executive function); see also M. Elizabeth Magill,
The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1189 n.178 (2000)
(collecting evidence from opinions authored by the Office of Legal Counsel).
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and Recommendation Clauses. Both petitions and presentments are
important information-gathering devices for the Government and
particularly the President. They are the stuff that fills the nation's
suggestion box. Several scholars have shown that petitions would
inform government officials about local conditions and popularsentiments.187 The information gathering characteristic of the
petition stands at the core of the Petition Clause."'8 The petition is
perhaps best understood as a mini-State of the Union Message from
the People to the President. As historian Arthur Schlesinger
eloquently put it, "The people through their representatives, their
newspapers and their right of petition had to be free to send
back their own state-of-the-union messages to the President."189
So too presentments would serve an important information
gathering function and an important recommendation function as
well. James Wilson observed:
The grand jury are [sic] a great channel of communication,
between those who make and administer the laws, and those
for whom the laws are made and administered. All the
operations of government, and of its ministers and officers, are
within the compass of their view and research. They may
suggest publick improvements, and the modes of removing
publick inconveniences: they may expose to publick inspection,
or to publick punishment, publick bad men, and publick bad
measures.190
James Wilson's words highlight the "great channel of commu-
nication" between the grand jury, as spokespersons for the People,
and the President who "administer[s] the laws." The grand jury's
recommendations-whether in the form of"publick improvements"
or pointing out "publick bad measures'--would undoubtedly assist
187. See Higginson, supra note 175, at 153-55; Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law
Abridging...: An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1153, 1178-79 (1986). Petitions and presentments served as prominent information-
gathering devices in the election of 1816. See AMAR, BILLOFRIGiS, supra note 134, at 31,85.
188. AMAR, BIUL OF RIoGrs, supra note 134, at 31 (observing that the Petition Clause "is
not primarily concerned with the problem of overweening majoritarianism; it is at least
equally concerned with the problem of attenuated representation).
189. Schlesinger, Major Themes, supra note 51, at xxxvi.
190. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 537 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
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the President in executing her duty under the Recommendation
Clause.191
Fourth, and most importantly, the President's recommendations
under the Recommendation Clause are especially important vehicles
for the redress of the People's grievances, presented to the President
in the form of petitions and presentments.19 President Ulysses S.
Grant emphasized the connection between the People's grievances
and the President's recommendations in his first State of the Union
Message in 1869: "On all leading questions agitating the public
mind I will always express my views to Congress and urge them
according to my judgment.... I shall on all subjects have a policy to
recommend, but none to enforce against the will of the people."'93
There is a neat functional linkage between the Veto Clause and
the Recommendation Clause as well. As Alexander Hamilton
explained in The Federalist No. 73, the veto power "serves as a
shield to the executive" and "establishes a salutary check upon the
legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the
effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to
the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of
that body."' 9' If the Veto Clause is the People's shield, the
Recommendation Clause is the People's sword.
191. See RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAD JURY IN THE UNrrED
STATES, 1634-1941, at 2(1963) (stating that grand juries at the Founding"acted in the nature
of local assemblies: making known the wishes of the people, proposing new laws, protesting
against abuses in government, performing administrative tasks, and looking after the welfare
of their communities").
192. See Bybee, supra note 7, at 105 n.269 ("The Recommendation Clause empowers the
President to represent the people before Congress, by recommending measures for the
reform of government, for the general welfare, or for the redress of grievances.); Sidak,
Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2119 ("Through his performance of the duty to
recommend measures to Congress, the President functions as the agent of a diffuse electorate
who seek the redress of grievances.").
193. First Inaugural Address of President Ulysses S. Grant (Mar. 4, 1869), reprinted in 8
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESmENTS, supra note 37, at 6.
194. TIH FEDERALSt NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National
Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 247 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (similarly characterizing the veto power as a shield for the rights of
the Executive). For two earlier statements describing the veto power as a shield for the rights
of the people, see 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 74 (remarks of James Madison), and id. at 74-
75 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry).
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B. "Such Measures": The Legislation Principle
The phrase "such Measures"'95 is the font of the legislation
principle. Today much if not most legislation "originates" in the
Office of the President." In Clinton v. City of New York, 19 the
Supreme Court, after citing the text of the State of the Union and
Recommendation Clauses, simply concluded: "Thus, [the President]
may initiate and influence legislative proposals."'98 Despite this
conclusion it is not self-evident that the Recommendation Clause is
concerned with legislation per se. The use of the word "Congress" in
the State of the Union Clause and the phrase "their Consideration"
in the Recommendation Clause are hints that these clauses
concern legislation. Even so, it is the phrase "such Measures" that
crystallizes the legislative contour of the Recommendation Clause.
One well-accepted meaning of the word "measure" at the
Founding, and one largely overlooked today, is a "legislative bill or
enactment."'9 The Recommendation Clause thus makes clear that
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
196. See How Our Laws Are Made, at http/thomas.loc.gov/home/]awsmade.bysec/
sourcesofleg.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) (discussing sources of legislation in the House
of Representatives).
In modern times, the "executive communication" has become a prolific source of
legislative proposals. The communication is usually in the form of a message or
letter from a member of the President's Cabinet, the head of an independent
agency, or the President transmitting a draft of a proposed bill to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate.
Id. This practice is especially important when it comes to the national budget. See id.; see also
Origins ofLegislation, at http'//thomas.loc.guv/home/enactment/origins.html (last visited Sept.
15, 2002) (discussing origins of legislation in the Senate and quoting the text of the State of
the Union and Recommendations Clauses). All bills, of course, must formally originate in one
of the two Houses of Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives."); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as
on other Bills."); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return
it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.") (emphasis added).
197. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
198. Id. at 438.
199. WEBSTER'S II NEWRIVERSIDE UNwvnITYDIcTIoNARY736(1988). One of us previously
examined the definition of the word "measure" but missed the critical legislative definition
of the word, which was in all probability in the minds of the Framers. See Sidak,
Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2084 n.24 (defining "measure" only as "plan or
course of action intended to attain some object) (citing 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 280
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the President shall recommend legislation and not merely put forth
indefinite ideas. Indeed, the word "measures" may have been chosen
by the Framers with some care. The draft of the Committee of
Detail provided: "It shall be his Duty ... to recommend Matters to
their Consideration .... "0 The Legislature considers matters but
resolves on measures, a point made especially clear by the same
Committee of Detail draft that only a few lines later provided: "It
shall be his Duty ... to expedite all such Measures as may be
resolved on by the Legislature .... One common, accepted
meaning of the word "matter" is a "subject of concern, feeling, or
action."" 2 The word "subject" invites one to ponder the Opinion
Clause of Article II, which provides that the President "may require
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of
their respective Offices .... 0' The Recommendation Clause does
(1970)). This point is similar to the question posed in Sidak & Smith, Four Faces of the Item
Veto, supra note 6, to which the Constitution's text gives no answer: "What is a bill?"
200. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 158 (emphasis added). This language mirrored Article
XIX of the New York Constitution of 1777, which provided that "it shall be the duty of the
Governor ... to recommend such matters to [the Legislature's] consideration as shall appear
to him to concern its good government, welfare, and prosperity." N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art.
XIX, in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 1335 (emphasis added).
201. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 158 (emphasis added); see also id. at 252 (remarks of
George Mason) (stating that Congress "could carry such measures as they pleased"); id. at 299
(remarks of Gouverneur Morris) (stating that legislators will "concur in measures"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 50, at 317-20 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (referring to
"measures" of "legislative assembly"). This language also mirrored Article XIX of the New
York Constitution of 1777, which provided that "it shall be the duty of the Governor ... to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of his ability; and to expedite all such
measures as may be resolved upon by the legislature." N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX, in 2
FEDERALAND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 1335; see also PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20,
in 2 FEDERALAND STATE CONSTITUnONS, supra note 29, at 1545 ("[President and Council] are
also to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; they are to expedite the execution of
such measures as may be resolved upon by the general assembly...."). The juxtaposition of the
phrase "expedite all such measures" with the State counterpart to the Take Care Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and
shall Commission all the Officers of the United States."), may be no accident. The next draft
of the Committee of Detail omitted the phrase "expedite all such measures" in favor of a
precursor to the Take Care Clause. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 171 ("(He shall take
Care to the best of his Ability, that the Laws) <It shall be his duty to provide for the due &
faithful exec-of the Laws> of the United States (be faithfully executed) <to the best of his
ability>").
202. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSIrY DICTIONARY 733 (1988).
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The secret drafting history of the
Opinion Clause provides additional evidence of the distinction in meaning between the words
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not provide that the President "shall ... recommend to their
Consideration such Subjects as he shall judge necessary and
expedient."2°'
One of us has previously argued that the substitution of the
word "Measures" for "Matters" in the Recommendation Clause
"reinforces the inference that the Framers intended the President's
recommendations to be more than precatory statements urging
Congress to work for peace and prosperity[,J" and that "[tlo the
extent that a 'measure' connotes the formulation of a proposed
solution to an identified condition, the submission of 'measures'
implies greater presidential participation in the lawmaking process
than would the mere submission of 'matters' to Congress for its
rumination."2°5
If one takes the distinction between "Matters" and "Measures"
seriously, it may not be enough, constitutionally speaking, for the
President to say to Congress that it must address pressing national
issues such as the financial viability of Social Security or Medicare.
Although the President may surely make subject-matter recom-
mendations to Congress pursuant to her executive power, the
Recommendation Clause calls for more, and perhaps far more.
Perhaps the President must recommend to Congress how to address
the financial restructuring of Social Security or Medicare-and with
draft legislation to boot.2" Perhaps the President would be bound
"measures" and "matters," as well as the similarity in meaning between the words "matters"
and "subjects." A precursor to the Opinion Clause provided:
The President of the United States shall have a Privy-Council ... whose duty it
shall be to advise him in matters respecting the execution of his Office, which he
shall think proper to lay before them: But their advice shall not conclude him,
nor affect his responsibility for the measures which he shall adopt....
2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 367 (emphasis added).
204. Consider, however, the description penned by St. George Tucker:
But this power of recommending any subject to the consideration of congress,
carries no obligation with it. It stands precisely on the same footing, as a
message from the king of England to parliament; proposing a subject for
deliberation, not pointing out the mode of doing the thing which it recommends.
1 TUCKER'S COMNENTARIES, supra note 58, app. at 344 (emphasis added).
205. Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2084.
206. The Recommendation Clause admittedly does not specify the form of the President's
measures. See C. ELLIS STEvENs, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 158-
59 n.2 (MacMillan and Co., 2d ed. 1927) (1894).
The Constitution does not prescribe the form in which the President shall
present the measures which he may recommend; nor does it vest the Congress
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politically (albeit not constitutionally) to support such legislation
if it were passed by both Houses of Congress. As President Polk
stated in his fourth State of the Union Message in 1848: "When the
President recommends measures to Congress, he avows in the most
solemn form his opinions, gives his voice in their favor, and pledges
himself in advance to approve them if passed by Congress." °7 One
can analogize here to offer and acceptance in contract law.208
Politically, the recommendation is a binding offer that lasts until
the end of the current Congress. Thereafter, the composition,
leadership, and party control of Congress may change, such that the
process of legislative horse trading might produce entirely different
deals between Congress and the President that reflect changes in
bargaining power, information, and other circumstances.
The Social Security or Medicare example is not so hypo-
thetical or inconsequential as it may initially seem. Consider the
paradigmatic national emergency at the Founding-invasion by a
foreign enemy. It would be hardly constitutionally sufficient for the
President to say to a special session of Congress: "I am the
Commander-in-Chief and I am intimately familiar with our nation's
military requirements. We need more troops, ships of war, and the
like. Please pass whatever legislation you like to provide for the
common defense."'
That said, early presidents did not take the distinction between
"Measures" and "Matters" very seriously. President Washington was
hesitant to recommend anything in his first Inaugural Address.21
with the power to do it, either by an express provision or by any reasonable
implication. It leaves the determination of the form, therefore, to the President
himself.
Id. (citation omitted).
207. See Fourth Annual Message of James K Polk (Dec. 5, 1848), reprinted in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 767.
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24-70 (1981).
209. The Constitution implicitly calls for the President to prepare and recommend plans
of offense and defense to the Congress in time of war. Gouverneur Morris' proposal for a
"Council of State" to "assist the President in conducting the Public affairs" provides some
interesting clues. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 342. The proposal, with respect to the
Secretary of War, provided: "It shall be his duty ... in time of war to prepare & recommend
plans of offence and defence." Id. at 343; see also id. (noting a similar provision with respect
to the Secretary of the Marine: "It shall be his duty ... in the time of war to prepare &
recommend plans of offence and defence.").
210. See Currie, supra note 165, at 188 (stating that President Washington's "reticence"
to exercise the duty of the Recommendation Clause was "lolne of the most conspicuous
2002]
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After giving his third State of the Union Message in 1792,
Washington wrote that "[m]otives of delicacy" had "uniformly
restrained" him "from introducing any topick which relates to
Legislative matters to members of either house of Congress, lest it
should be suspected that he wished to influence the question before
it."211 So too, President Thomas Jefferson avoided specificity in his
recommendations, fearing that they might appear as regal edicts.
2 12
It was not until President Andrew Jackson took office that the
President championed specific issues in the annual State of the
Union Message. President Jackson was not shy about exercising his
duty under the Recommendation Clause; his first State of the Union
Message contained more than ten specific recommendations.213
Among early presidents, however, President Jackson represented
the exception. As Professor Martin Flaherty explained, "nineteenth-
century presidents used this [Recommendation Clause] authority
sparingly, and then generally in abstract, almost ritualistic ways. 21'
That said, early twentieth-century presidents significantly
changed the prevailing nineteenth-century norm. Presidents
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt
seized the legislative initiative. One Member of Congress expressed
the prevailing twentieth-century sentiment well when he told a
member of the President's staff, "[DIon't expect us to start from
features of this speech").
211. 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 493 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
Actually, as Professor Currie reminds us, President Washington's original draft of his
Inaugural Address had contained a "detailed legislative program" for Congress's
consideration, but then-Representative James Madison apparently omitted it out of concern
for the separation of powers. See Currie, supra note 165, at 189 n.190 (quoting RALPH
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON, A BIOGRAPHY 277-78 (MacMillan, 1971)); see also TULIS, supra
note 52, at 48 (noting that President Washington "had originally prepared a seventy-three-
page set of recommendations to Congress as his first draft of the Inaugural, thinking that he
would speak as part of his constitutional duty" under the Recommendation Clause). If
Representative Madison's involvement appears odd, it should not. Before President
Washington had an inner circle of Heads of Departments (i.e., a Cabinet), Representative
Madison was "in essence Washington's 'aide, grand vizier, and prime minister. Currie, supra
note 165, at 183 n.155 (citing KETCHAM, supra, at 286-87, 315-17, 319-21).
212. See, e.g., First Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in 1 THE
STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 321-24.
213. See First Annual Message of Andrew Jackson (Mar. 4, 1829), reprinted in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 294-314.
214. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1818 (1996).
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scratch on what you people want. That's not the way we do things
here-you draft the bills and we work them over."215
One should not leap, however, to the conclusion that the
legislation principle of the Recommendation Clause is almost
entirely an informal twentieth-century "amendment by practice" to
the Recommendation Clause. President Washington took an overly
conservative approach to the Recommendation Clause. Professor
Cass Sunstein has remarked that President Washington's "own
approach does seem extreme" and that the Recommendation Clause
"authorizes a broader role."216 We agree.
The Recommendation Clause's invitation to the President to be
the Legislator-in-Chief is yet more apparent when we consider the
President's other duties. A tight, albeit overlooked, relationship
exists between the Recommendation Clause and the Take Care
Clause of Article II, which provides that the President "shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ...."M The President, as
Administrator-in-Chief of the executive bureaucracy, would possess
a systematic working knowledge of the laws of the United States.21
This knowledge would put the President in a unique position to
revise legislation pursuant to the "last word" of the Recom-
mendation Clause and to recommend new legislation pursuant to
her "first word." Sometimes existing laws will need to be amended
or even repealed, and the need for amendment or repeal may only
be apparent upon the execution of the law by the President.
Sometimes new laws will be needed to ensure that the President
shall fulfill her duty under the Take Care Clause. The net effect of
these changes to the laws would be to lead the federal government
down the experience curve of law making.219
215. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program,
49 AM. POL Sci. REV. 980, 1015 (1955) (quoting a senior Member of Congress).
216. Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century President in a Twenty-First Century World,
48 ARK. L. REV. 1, 9 (1995).
217. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
218. For more on the President as Administrator-in-Chief, see, for example, Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 7, at 603-15; Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief
Administrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991
(1993).
219. Consider, however, James Madison's prediction:
The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and
the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements on the first draught will
every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the government
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The secret drafting history of the Constitution is illuminating.
Gouverneur Morris proposed forming a Privy Council to "assist the
President in conducting the Public affairs," and provided that the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court "shall from time to time
recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of the U.S.
as may in his opinion be necessary to the due administration of
Justice, and such as may promote useful learning and inculcate
sound morality throughout the Union ..... 220 Early commentators on
the Constitution suggested a paired reading of the Recommendation
and Take Care Clauses. St. George Tucker observed that "any
inconveniencies resulting from new laws, or for the want of adequate
laws upon any subject, more immediately occur to those who are
entrusted with the administration of the government, than to
others, less immediately concerned therein."21 Justice Story
similarly observed that "Ithe President] is thus justly made
responsible, not merely for a due administration of the existing
systems, but for due diligence and examination into the means of
improving them." 2 Indeed, the Recommendation Clause and the
Take Care Clause appear in the same section of Article II. As one of
us has previously observed: "A reasonable inference about the
textual proximity of the two clauses is that executing a particular
law and recommending ways to improve that law are closely
related."2
23
Finally, the legislation principle need not be limited to ordinary
legislation. The Recommendation Clause surely permits the
President to recommend "higher" legislation-in other words, to
recommend to Congress that it propose amendments to the
Constitution pursuant to Article V of the Constitution. So thought
President Washington in his first Inaugural Address, and so
will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members [of
Congress].
THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 334 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
220. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 342.
221. 1 TUCKERS CoMMNTARIES, supra note 58, app. at 344 (emphasis added).
222. 3 STORYS COMMENTARiES, supra note 9, § 1555 (emphasis added).
223. Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2085; see also Bybee, supr note 7,
at 105 (stating that the Recommendation Clause "draws from the President's experience and
his superior access to information relating to his other considerable powers, including his
powers as Commander in Chief, as the executor of the laws, and as principal representative
of the United States in foreign relations") (emphasis added).
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thought the House of Representatives of the First Congress in its
reply to President Washington.22' Early presidents exercised the
prerogative to recommend higher legislation. In his sixth State of
the Union Message in 1806, President Jefferson expressed doubts
that "public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects
of public improvement" fell within the enumerated powers of the
Congress, and he recommended an amendment to give to the
Congress the power to fund these objects.225 President Monroe
recommended a similar amendment in his first State of the Union
Message in 1817,226 and again in his sixth State of the Union
Message in 1822, after he had vetoed a bill to fund the Cumberland
Road because he thought it unconstitutional.227 President Jackson
too recommended a specific and now especially timely constitutional
amendment in his first State of the Union Message in 1829: "I would
therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as
may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President
and Vice-President."22
C. "As He Shall Judge Necessary and Expedient"" The Executive
Discretion Principle
The phrase "as he shall judge necessary and expedient"' is the
font of the executive discretion principle.20 The use of the word
"judge" in the Recommendation Clause suggests a special degree of
deliberation by the President, in seemingly stark contrast to a
224. See First Inaugural Address of George Washington (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESMENTS, supra note 37, at 51, 56; Address of the House of
Representatives to George Washington, President of the United States (May 5, 1789),
reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 37, at 567.
225. Sixth Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 2, 1806), reprinted in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 87-88.
226. First Annual Message of James Monroe (Mar. 4, 1817), reprinted in 1 STATE OF
UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 154.
227. Sixth Annual Message of James Monroe (Dec. 3, 1822), reprinted in 1 STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 197-98.
228. First Annual Message of Andrew Jackson (Mar. 4, 1829), reprinted in 1 STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 299.
229. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
230. Cf Amar, Some Opinions, supra note 7, at 672-75 (discussing executive discretion
principle of Opinion Clause); id. at 672-73 (inviting applicability of executive discretion
principle to State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses).
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companion clause, which provides that "in Case of Disagreement
between [the Houses of Congress], with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, [the President] may adjourn them to such Time as he
shall think proper."23 The word "judge" also stands in contrast with
the Recommendation Clause's counterpart in Article XIX of the New
York Constitution of 1777, which provided that "it shall be the duty
of the governor ... to recommend such matters to their consideration
as shall appear to him to concern its good government, welfare, and
prosperity." 2
The verb "judge" in the Recommendation Clause connotes that
the President's discretion to make recommendations must be
exercised judiciously-with wisdom rather than caprice. Examining
Article III for clues about the essence of judiciousness, one might
infer that the Framers expected the President, in the exercise of
his prerogative to make recommendations, to exhibit the same
rectitude, sobriety, and wisdom as "[tihe Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, [who] shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior.... "2' To Alexander Hamilton, writing in The
Federalist No. 78, the good-behavior standard was relevant to all
three branches:
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the
judicial magistracy is certainly one of the most valuable of the
modern improvements in the practice of government. In a
monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the
prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And
it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government
to secure a steady, upright and impartial administration of the
laws.'
Thus, Hamilton plainly understood good behavior to be a standard
relevant to the President's execution of the laws, which we have
shown is closely related to the President's duty to recommend
231. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
232. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX, in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrUTIoNs, supra note 29,
at 1335 (emphasis added).
233. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
234. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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measures to Congress. Likewise, William Rawle observed in his
treatise: "It is a duty of the president to acquire, as far as possible,
an intimate knowledge of the capacities and characters of his fellow
citizens; to disregard the importunities of friends; the hints or
menaces of enemies; the bias of party, and the hope of popularity."23
These understandings might have been aspirational, and not an
expression of the characteristics whose absence would justify
impeachment. Nevertheless, that distinction would not limit the
insight here for Article II. If one sought a substitute expression for
the phrase "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"2 6
Hamilton's phrase "secure a steady, upright and impartial
administration of the laws" 237 would be a very strong candidate.
The verb "judge" in the Recommendation Clause also signifies
that the President is the indeed last and only word on what
recommendations he shall make.' The question of whether a
particular recommendation is necessary and expedient is a
quintessentially political question committed to the President-in
our modem constitutional parlance, it is a "textually demonstrable
commitment of the [adjudicatory] issue to a coordinate political
department."' 9 Congress may not, therefore, judge what recom-
mendations are necessary and expedient. President Ulysses S.
Grant made this point clear in his first State of the Union Message.
He aggressively stated: "On all leading questions agitating the
public mind I will always express my views to Congress and urge
them according to my judgment .... I shall on all subjects have a
policy to recommend, but none to enforce against the will of the
people."2 ° Congress could refuse to appropriate funds to enable the
President to recommend legislation, but such action would not be
constitutional.241 Furthermore, any attempt by Congress to limit the
235. RAWLE'S COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 164.
236. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
237. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
238. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper' Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 278 n.38 (1993).
239. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
240. First Inaugural Address of Ulysses S. Grant (Mar. 4, 1869), reprinted in 7 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 37, at 6.
241. See Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2118; Sidak, The President's
Power of the Purse, supra note 102, at 1202-22. For an early view taken during the Jay Treaty
debates, see 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 529 (statement of Speaker of the House Sedgwick) ("To
support the Constitution each department must be enabled to perform the functions assigned
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scope of the President's discretion under the Recommendation
Clause would be flatly unconstitutional.242
This point appears in at least five other interesting ways if one
considers constitutional structure. First, consider executive
privilege. One could say that, "if the Constitution protects the
President's right to explore policy alternatives in secret, it must also
protect his right to explore policy alternatives in the open.""
Second, consider the Petition Clause. If "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,"2' then
Congress shall make no law muzzling the President, because the
President is the man of the People and the representative of their
petitions.4
Third, consider the principle of separation of powers and the
postulate of "perfectly co-ordinate" departments.2  A muzzling law
to it. To enable the Executive to do its duties, the compensation must be provided."). For
a contrary view, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the
Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1143, 1154-55 (1999).
242. There has been significant hubbub in recent years over congressional attempts to limit
the scope of the Recommendation Clause. One of us has written: "During the Reagan
presidency, Congress frequently inserted into appropriations bills specific riders prohibiting
the Executive Branch or an independent regulatory agency from advocating or even studying
a change in a particular policy." Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2079. Sidak
has dubbed these appropriations riders "muzzling laws" and has argued that they are
unconstitutional because they violate the Recommendation Clause. Id. at 2118-28; see also
Bybee, supra note 7, at 104 ("By the terms of the Recommendation Clause, Congress lacks the
power either to command the President to make certain recommendations or to forbid the
President from doing so."). It should go without saying that "muzzling laws" are
unconstitutional even if the President agrees to such legislation. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 942 n. 13 (1983) ("The assent of the Executive to a bill which also contains a provision
contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from judicial review.").
243. Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2124.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
245. See Bybee, supra note 7, at 105 n.269 ("The argument that the First Amendment
disables Congress ... implies that the First Amendment limits Congress' power to restrict the
President's recommendation power."); Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2119
("To muzzle the President, therefore, is to diminish the effectiveness of this right expressly
reserved to the people under the first amendment.).
246. See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTNo. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common
commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of
settling the boundaries between their respective powers ..... ) (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the constitutional "postulate" of coordinate departments, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J.
217, 228-40 (1994).
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is a paradigmatic legislative encroachment on the other depart-
ments. Fourth, consider the principle of co-extensiveness. Congress
may not limit the scope of the President's veto power, and the scope
of the Recommendation Clause must be at least as expansive as that
of the veto power; otherwise the President "may veto any bill that
emerges from Congress, but may not always give Congress advance
warning of an intention to veto, or may not always try to forestall a
veto by proposing better alternatives."24 Finally, there is perhaps
the consideration of republican government. One of us has argued
that muzzling laws violate the principle of "republican democracy,"
without, however, going so far as to say that muzzling laws violate
the Guarantee Clause or the Constitution's implicit promise of a
republican federal government.2"
Although the President's discretion is significant and may not
be limited by Congress, it has bounds. The executive discretion
of the Recommendation Clause may not swallow up the executive
duty of the same clause. There should be some constitutional
standard to prevent the President from sitting on her laurels and
judging that nothing is necessary and expedient.249 After all, the
Recommendation Clause is mandatory all around: The President
"shall ... recommend ... such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient."' Consider again the paradigmatic situation of
necessity and expediency-invasion by a foreign enemy. Would
it be appropriate, constitutionally speaking, for the President to
247. Rabkin & Devins, supra note 45, at 231 n.131.
248. See Sidak, Recommendation Clause, supra note 7, at 2118-20.
249. This statement begs the question of whether the inactivity of President Calvin
Coolidge, whose nickname was "Silent Cal," was constitutional:
The political genius of President Coolidge, Walter Lippmann pointed out in
1926, was his talent for effectively doing nothing: 'This active inactivity suits
the mood and certain of the needs of the country admirably. It suits all the
business interests which want to be let alone.... And it suits all those who have
become convinced that government in this country has become dangerously
complicated and top-heavy...."
Calvin Coolidge, at http'//www.whitehouse.gov/historypresidents/cc3O.html (lastvisited Sept.
11, 2002). Of course, President Coolidge didn't do absolutely nothing, just "effectively"
nothing. He had a small number of achievements in both domestic and foreign affairs. See
Calvin Coolidge, at http//gi.grolier.con/presidents/ea/bios/30pcool.html (last visited Sept. 11,
2002). Perhaps he thought that the necessary and expedient thing to do was in fact effectively
nothing. We thank Professor Michael Gerhardt for bringing Coolidge's style of governance to
our attention.
250. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
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recommend nothing on such an extraordinary occasion? Surely
not. The President's silence on such an occasion would violate the
President's oath or affirmation to "preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States,""' and thus be a proper cause for
impeachment. It should go without saying that one who accepts the
responsibilities of Commander-in-Chief vows to fight for the nation's
survival. The Constitution could not tolerate an American version
of Vichy France, for example.2"2
Finally, the phrase "necessary and expedient" demands scrutiny.
Here again the Recommendation Clause represents a significant
departure from its counterpart in Article XIX of the New York
Constitution of 1777, which provided that "it shall be the duty of the
governor ... to recommend such matters to their consideration as
shall appear to him to concern its good government, welfare, and
prosperity.253 The phrase "necessary and expedient" is unique in the
Constitution. A dedicated textualist would want to compare and
contrast this phrase with "necessary and proper" in the Necessary
and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8,' "absolutely necessary"
in the State Imposts and Duties Clause of Article I, Section 10,255
and the use of simply the word "necessary" in a triad of other
clauses in the Constitution. 2" Although the word "expedient"
appears only once in the Constitution, the word was familiar to the
Framers of the Constitution, given its use in state constitutions and
other important Founding documents.5 7 To the extent that the
251. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. For a discussion of the special importance of the prolix
Presidential Oath or Affirmation Clause, see Paulsen, supra note 246, at 261-62; Joel K.
Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 791, 828-29 (1999).
252. See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 52-54 (1991) (arguing that on
four separate grounds the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has a constitutional duty to
fight to the death to defend the nation). But cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv. 101, 128 (1984).
253. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX, in 2 FEDERALAND STATE CONSTITrTIONS, supra note 29,
at 1335 (emphasis added).
254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
255. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
256. See U.S. CONS'r. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; id. art. 11; id. art. V.
257. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl., in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTIUIONS, supra
note 29, at 1329; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. II art. VI, in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 965; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. X, in FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 11; NORTHWEST ORDINANCE of 1787, pmbl., in 1
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 429.
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Necessary and Proper Clause contains distinct "necessity" and
"proprietary" elements,"'8 it would follow that the Recommen-
dation Clause also contains distinct "necessity" and "expediency"
elements." 9 Indeed, there is a sense in which judging what is
necessary is different from judging what is expedient. For example,
something may be necessary but inexpedient, or expedient but
unnecessary.2" And there is an even greater sense in which judging
what is "necessary and expedient" is different from what is
"necessary and proper"-a point presumptively made by difference
in word choice. For example, something may be both necessary and
expedient but improper, or both necessary and proper but
inexpedient.261 The critic would argue that the phrases "necessary
and proper" and "necessary and expedient" do not contain two
258. See James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 205-06 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1979); see also Randy E.
Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 787 (1997); Lawson & Granger, supra
note 238, at 331.
259. Article III, Section 10 of the Hamilton Plan contains distinct necessity and propriety
elements:
The President at the beginning of every meeting of the Legislature as soon as
they shall be ready to proceed to business, shall convene them together at the
place where the Senate shall sit, and shall communicate to them all such
matters as may be necessary for their information, or as may require their
consideration. He may by message during the Session communicate all other
matters which may appear to him proper.
3 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 624 (emphasis added).
260. Cf. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 418 (proposal of James McHenry and Charles
Cotesworth Pinkney) (using phrases "judged expedient" and "judged necessary" as distinct
terms in proposal concerning Duties or Imposts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2).
261. Notwithstanding this linguistic point, "expedient" in the Recommendation Clause does
not mean "improper," to the extent "improper" could be construed to mean "unconstitutional."
Cf Lawson & Granger, supra note 238, at 297-326 (discussing the "jurisdictional" meaning
of the word "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). We
think it is beyond question that the President must believe her recommendations under the
Recommendation Clause to be constitutional. Such an understanding is implicit in the
Recommendation Clause itself, and also flows from the President's oath to support the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, c. 8; id. art. VI, cl. 3; see also Lawson, Everything
I Need To Know About Presidents I Learned From Dr. Seuss, supra note 33, at 383 (stating
that "Itihe President's responsibilities under the Recommendation Clause are clear:
recommend to Congress the enactment of measures that are constitutional, and recommend
the repeal of existing laws that are unconstitutional"); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore,
The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1288 n.97 (1996)
(stating that "in exercising the recommendation power, the President must insure that his
proposals are constitutional").
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distinct terms, but rather one single and roughly synonymous term
of art.2
62
What does "expedient" mean? One dictionary definition is
"[a]ppropriate to a given purpose."2 This definition appears to have
been taken by President Andrew Jackson in his first State of the
Union Message in 1829, when he stated: "The task devolves on me,
under a provision of the Constitution ... to propose such measures
as in the discharge of my official functions have suggested
themselves as necessary to promote the objects of our Union."264 One
contextual definition is "practicable" or "convenient."265 Another
dictionary definition-now archaic, but likely to have been in the
Framers' minds-is "speedy: expeditious. "2'e This latter definition
was probably used in an early draft of the Committee of Detail,
which provided: "It shall be his Duty ... to expedite all such
Measures as may be resolved on by the Legislature."267 This latter
definition of "expedient" becomes more crisp when one considers
the juxtaposition of the Recommendation Clause with the
Special Session Clause, which gives the President the right "on
extraordinary Occasions, [to] convene both Houses, or either of
them."26' The paradigmatic situation of expediency is when the
President exercises her right under the Special Session Clause. As
St. George Tucker noted:
The power of the president to convene either or both houses
of congress, was a provision indispensably necessary in a
government organized as the federal government is by the
constitution. Occasions may occur during the recess of congress,
262. St. George Tucker, for example, apparently thought that "necessary and expedient*
was no different from "necessary and proper." See 1 TUCKER'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 58,
app. at 344 ("[Ilt is likewise provided, that the first magistrate of the union should recommend
to the consideration of congress such measures as he shall judge necessary, and proper.").
263. WEBsTER'S II NEW RIVERsmE UNrvERSITY DICTIONARY 454 (1988).
264. First Annual Message of Andrew Jackson (Mar. 4,1829), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF
THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 294 (emphasis added).
265. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 166 (remarks of James Wilson) (referring to
proposal as "practicable or expedient"); 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 297 (remarks of
Gouverneur Morris) (referring to amendment as "unnecessary and inconvenient").
266. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSrrY DICTIONARY 454 (1988).
267. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 158 (emphasis added).
268. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also NoRTHWEST ORDINANCE of 1787, pmbl., in 1 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 429 ("The governor shall have power to convene
... the general assembly, when in his opinion, it shall be expedient.").
[Vol. 44:1
THE LEGISLATOR-IN-CHIEF
for taking the most vigorous and decisive measures to repel
injury, or provide for defence: congress, only, is competent to
these objects: the president may therefore convene them for that
purpose. Or it may happen that an important treaty hath been
negotiated during the recess of the senate, and their advice
thereupon be required, without delay, either, that the
ratification may be exchanged in due time, or for some other
important reason. On such extraordinary occasions as these, if
there were not a power lodged in the president to convene the
senate, or the congress, as the case might require, the affairs of
the nation might be thrown into confusion and perplexity, or
worse.
269
The Recommendation Clause thus calls for heightened sensitivity
in times of national exigency.
CONCLUSION
The President's role in the legislative process begins long before
she signs or vetoes a bill presented to her by Congress. The thirty-
one words contained in the State of the Union and Recommendation
Clauses envision the President as an active participant in the
embryonic stages of law making. Close analysis of those words
reveals eight separate principles that animate the President's
responsibilities as the Legislator-in-Chief.
The State of the Union Clause imposes an executive duty on
the President. That duty must be discharged periodically. The
President's assessment of the State of the Union must be publi-
cized to Congress, and thus to the nation. The publication of
the President's assessment conveys information to Congress-
information uniquely gleaned from the President's perspective in
her various roles as Commander-in-Chief, chief law enforcer,
269. 1 TUCMR'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 58, app. at 345. Justice Story similarly noted:
- The power to convene congress on extraordinary occasions is indispensable to
the proper operations, and even safety of the government. Occasions may occur
in the recess of congress, requiring the government to take vigorous measures
to repel foreign aggressions, depredations, and direct hostilities; to provide
adequate means to mitigate, or overcome unexpected calamities; to suppress
insurrections; and to provide for innumerable other important exigencies,
arising out of the intercourse and revolutions among nations.
3 STORYS COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 1556.
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negotiator with foreign powers, and the like-that shall aid the
legislature in public deliberation on matters that may justify the
enactment of legislation because of their national importance.
The Recommendation Clause also imposes an executive duty on
the President. Her recommendations respect the equal dignity of
Congress and thus embody the anti-royalty sentiment that ignited
the American Revolution and subsequently stripped the trappings
of monarchy away from the new chief executive. Through her
recommendations to Congress, the President speaks collectively for
the People as they petition Government for a redress of grievances,
and thus her recommendations embody popular sovereignty. The
President tailors her recommendations so that their natural
implication is the enactment of new legislation, rather then some
other action that Congress might undertake. Finally, the President
shall have executive discretion to recommend measures of her
choosing.
When the State of the Union and Recommendation Clauses are
seen to have these analytical subtleties, Justice Hugo Black's
assessment that the President's "functions in the lawmaking
process" are limited to "the recommending of laws he thinks wise
and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad"27 is revealed to be too
abbreviated. The words of these two clauses reveal the sophis-
tication of the Framers' design by highlighting that the President,
through her institutionally unique ability to acquire and analyze
information valuable to the leadership of the Republic, would have
more to contribute to the making of laws than merely to sign off on
their creation by another branch. Far from making the President a
cipher in the legislative process, the Constitution created the
Legislator-in-Chief.
270. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
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